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In this issue, developments in some of the nations of sub-Sarahan Africa are evaluated, and the foreign policy of the United States, particularly its economic policy, is reviewed. As our introductory article points out, ". . . in the coming years, with continued tight aid budgets and competing priority needs elsewhere in the world, the question in United States foreign policy toward Africa may become more sharply drawn: whether the United States can protect and advance its security interests in the region while providing relatively small assistance programs and downplaying the serious economic problems facing African countries and their genuine need for international assistance."

United States Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY CAROL LANCASTER
Director of African Studies, Georgetown University

THE economic dimension of United States policies toward sub-Saharan African countries is a key part of United States relations with the region, despite the fact that economic flows between the United States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are relatively small.* United States trade in Africa has averaged less than five percent of total United States trade worldwide; United States investment in Africa as a proportion of total United States foreign investment is even smaller; and both trade and investment are concentrated in a few African countries. United States bilateral aid to Africa is also a small percentage of United States bilateral aid worldwide. Similarly, from an African perspective, the United States plays a relatively small role in the economic relations of African countries.

These facts seem to argue for the relative unimportance of United States economic policy in the framework of United States foreign policies toward the region. Yet the opposite is true; United States economic policies toward Africa play a particularly important role in supporting broader United States foreign policy goals on the continent.

First, Africa includes two-thirds of the very poorest countries in the world (i.e., those with a per capita income of less than $370 per year).[1] Many of these countries face not only serious long-run development problems but also immediate balance of payments crises. Sharp rises in their import prices over the last decade (particularly for petroleum), fluctuating prices and earnings for their exports, heavy foreign borrowing by African governments to ease the adjustment to deteriorating terms of trade, bad weather, and widespread economic mismanagement have forced many countries to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance and to seek a rescheduling (in some cases more than one) of their international public and private debts.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that foremost among the concerns of many African governments are their economic problems and their need for foreign resources, both public and private. Given such concerns among African governments and given the international economic position of the United States, the United States cannot be credible in its African policies if those policies do not give priority to economic issues.

Second, the very weakness and lack of diversity in United States ties of all kinds with many African countries give United States economic policies—particularly bilateral assistance—a special importance. Beyond the purely diplomatic relationship, bilateral aid may be the only link the United States has with some African governments. United States

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*In this article, the statistics and commentary refer only to sub-Saharan African countries; they do not include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt.

[1]International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *World Development Report, 1981* (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1981), p. 134.

ambassadors in such countries argue strenuously that a bilateral aid program—even a very small one—adds credibility to their presence, facilitates access to various parts of government and enhances their influence with political leaders of a country. Support for United States positions from small African countries may suddenly become important on such issues as key votes in international institutions, negotiations on the release of hostages or representation of United States interests to governments with whom they have friendly relations but we do not.

Finally, United States economic programs of all kinds give concrete expression to United States policies, both economic (e.g., supporting economic development, the expansion of foreign investment) and political (e.g., ensuring base rights or access to naval and air facilities). The administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan have recognized the importance of economic policies and programs in overall United States relations with African countries, although the priorities among goals and mixes of programs have differed.

United States trade with sub-Saharan Africa is small and is heavily concentrated in a relatively few countries. In 1979, United States imports amounted to $14 billion from African countries, 6.6 percent of total United States imports.[2] The largest item by far was petroleum ($8.6 billion from Nigeria, the second largest source of United States petroleum imports, $342 million from Gabon, and $347 million from Angola). Next came minerals, largely from South Africa.

In only four other African countries (Ivory Coast, Zaire, Ghana and the Cameroon) did United States imports exceed $200 million. It is interesting to note that the value of United States imports from Nigeria alone was over three times the value of United States imports from South Africa and, since 1973, has increased twice as fast as imports from South Africa.

United States exports to Africa totaled only $3.4 billion in 1979, substantially below imports from the region. Most of the United States trade deficit with Africa reflects the value of petroleum imports from Nigeria. In fact, in 1979, the second largest United States trade deficit with any single country was with Nigeria, totaling $8 billion. The significance of this fact is not economic; trade deficits can be offset by trade surpluses with other countries. The significance of the large United States deficit with Nigeria is political. In this unbalanced and undiversified economic relationship, the United States is the more dependent and vulnerable partner. United States oil imports (and investments) in Nigeria could conceivably become the target of pressure on broader political issues if United States relations with that country should deteriorate.

The United States has small trade deficits with many other African countries, reflecting the continuing tendency of many of these countries—particularly the francophone countries—to maintain close ties with their former colonial powers.

The trend in United States exports to Africa is not encouraging: while the absolute value of such exports has been rising, they have not kept up with the increase in United States exports worldwide. Thus, the percentage of total United States exports to Africa has fallen from 2.3 percent in 1973 to 1.8 percent in 1979. From the African perspective, imports from the United States as a proportion of total imports remain small but have risen slightly, from 8 percent in 1973 to 11 percent in 1979.

A key aspect of United States trade with Africa is the role of strategic minerals. United States dependence on mineral imports has been growing over recent years. Concern over the strategic and economic implications of that dependence has increased, particularly since the mid-1970's, when minerals prices rose sharply and it was believed that raw materials cartels modeled on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) might be organized. That fear now appears groundless; but with the uncertainties generated by the changing political scene in southern Africa, concerns about United States dependence on minerals in that region have intensified.

United States mineral imports from southern Africa, and particularly from the Republic of South Africa, represent a substantial proportion of our consumption of certain minerals critical to military and industrial production. Principal among these minerals are cobalt, manganese, the platinum group, vanadium, chromium and industrial diamonds. In many cases, the only significant current alternative supplier is the Soviet Union. This dependence has given rise to a debate on three basic issues: the likelihood of an interruption in supply of essential minerals from South Africa; the impact of such an interruption on the United States economy; and the policy implications of United States dependence on African minerals, especially from the Republic of South Africa.

Some members of Congress and the business community[3] have argued that the United States and its allies in Europe and Japan should be more

[2]International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade 1980* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1980). All trade statistics in this article are drawn from this publication.

[3]See, for example, House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Minerals Needs of the Western World,* July, 1980; and Robert Buckley, "Resource War Near over Critical Materials," *Financier,* March, 1981, pp. 32-37.

concerned about their vulnerability to supply interruptions—particularly prolonged ones—of minerals from southern Africa. They believe that such supply interruptions could occur as a result of political instabilities in the region or the accession to power of unfriendly governments that cooperate with the Soviet Union to manipulate world mineral supplies for political or economic advantage, and that, therefore, the United States should maintain close relations with friendly countries in the region, mainly South Africa. These arguments are also made to justify a more aggressive exploration and development of minerals supplies in the United States.

A recent report by a congressional research staff takes the opposite tack,[4] namely, that the United States could deal with a supply interruption without having to rely on the Soviet Union. The report points out that the United States has ample stockpiles of such minerals to cover short-term supply interruptions (in some cases, up to three years); that conservation in the nonessential uses of key minerals (e.g., platinum for jewelry) or the substitution of other minerals would substantially reduce the strain of a supply interruption; that in some cases the United States can obtain key minerals (e.g., chromium, possibly platinum) from domestic sources (albeit at high cost) or eventually from the seabed; and that, in any case, southern African countries are themselves heavily dependent on minerals exports and so would be unlikely to refuse to export such minerals even under governments hostile to the West.

The debate continued through the Carter administration and into the Reagan administration. However, United States minerals dependence was not a significant factor affecting United States policies toward South Africa under President Carter; and despite some initial statements by Reagan officials about "an era of resources war" in southern Africa, more recent statements suggest that minerals dependence is not now a significant factor in United States relations with South Africa.[5]

The pattern of United States investment in sub-Saharan Africa follows the trade pattern: it is a relatively small proportion (1.9 percent in 1980)[6] of United States foreign investment and is concentrated in a few sectors in a few countries. Of the $4.2 billion invested in Africa in 1980, over half was in South Africa, mainly in the minerals sector. Other countries hosting United States investment included Liberia and Nigeria, with relatively little in the rest of Africa. As with exports, United States investment in Africa is declining as a proportion of United States foreign investment worldwide, but it appears to be concentrated in South Africa. From roughly 35 percent of total United States investment in Africa in 1966, United States investment in South Africa grew to over 50 percent of United States investment in Africa in 1980.

These trends reflect a variety of problems and challenges. While many African governments (including those considered Marxist) have sought to attract United States investors, the small size of many African economies, the serious economic problems (including mismanagement and corruption), the political uncertainties, the unfamiliarity of United States business with African markets and business practices, and the preponderant influence of the French in markets in francophone African countries have all discouraged American business on the continent.

With such relatively few economic interests, it is hardly surprising that the United States business community has played a minor role in United States policymaking in the region and that much of its role has focused on investment policies in South Africa. However, in recent years the size of United States trade with black Africa has expanded and diversified. And in the last year or two, United States business has shown considerable interest in investing in Nigeria, Angola and Zimbabwe, perhaps foreshadowing a reversal in the trend toward the concentration of United States investment in South Africa.

The impact of these changes on policymaking in the United States is difficult to gauge. Yet it is clear that the business community is playing a more complex role in United States policies toward Africa in the 1980's. United States business would still resist legislation prohibiting new investment or requiring disinvestment by United States firms in South Africa. As hostile as the Carter administration was to South Africa, it opposed congressional efforts to prohibit new United States investment in South Africa (despite support by sectors of the American black community for such policies). On

[4]Congressional Research Service, *Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the United States and the OECD Countries,* Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September, 1980.

[5]A statement by the Reagan administration on this issue is contained in a speech by Princeton Lyman on "South African Minerals: U.S. Dependence," on October 29, 1981, before the Conference on U.S. Minerals Policy, Washington, D.C. The speech implicitly rejects the proposition that U.S. policy toward South Africa should be based on U.S. dependence on South African minerals. And it specifically downplays the likelihood of governments in the region seeking to cut off minerals exports as a policy tool, pointing out that minerals exports account for over 85 percent of South Africa's foreign exchange earnings.

[6]U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business,* August, 1981, p. 32.

the other hand, growing United States business interests in black Africa have resulted in business pressures on the Reagan administration to avoid too close a relationship with South Africa. Traders and investors (and the banks financing them) in Nigeria, Angola and elsewhere fear retaliation by black African governments for a United States policy too supportive of South Africa.

One other domestic United States group affects United States policy toward Africa: black Americans. During the Carter years, the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups and individuals representing the black community enjoyed unprecedented access to the Department of State and the White House on foreign policy issues. Not surprisingly, one of the principal foreign policy interests of these groups was United States policies toward Africa; they frequently supported African positions on major issues, including African economic problems and the need for United States foreign assistance to African nations.

Whether such groups were able to exert a significant influence on President Carter on the content of United States policy toward Africa is difficult to measure. They were, however, able to bring African issues before high officials in their periodic meetings, and they may have influenced the style of United States Africa policy, encouraging a sympathetic approach to African problems. In fact, much of the credit for a United States Africa policy that was seen by Africans as understanding of their problems—if not always agreeing with their proposed solutions—must go to United States Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young. In addition to his rapport with Africans, it almost seemed that the more trouble his public statements and activities made for him at home, the greater his credibility—and to some extent, that of the United States government—with African leaders abroad.

The role of black Americans in influencing Africa policy under the Reagan administration is likely to be far weaker. The access of black groups to high officials in the State Department has thus far been limited. Meanwhile, black political leadership seems preoccupied with issues raised by the administration's domestic policies.

The principal United States economic link to most African countries is bilateral assistance. There are three types of bilateral assistance programs: the development assistance program, providing funds and technical assistance to finance development projects; the Economic Support Fund (ESF) program, originally associated with military assistance programs but currently providing mainly commodity import funding and some development project financing; and the food aid program (Public Law 480), which provides concessional loans and grants to finance the purchase of food.

Since the mid-1970's, United States bilateral assistance to Africa has been increasing; from 1977 to 1981, it rose by nearly 270 percent—from $290 million to over $750 million.[7] The Reagan administration's 1982 request level to Congress for economic assistance to Africa was roughly the same as the estimated 1981 level. Reflecting the heightened priority of Africa in the Carter administration and the focus of economic assistance on helping poor people in poor countries, total United States bilateral assistance to Africa rose faster than assistance to any other area of the world and was distributed among a growing number of African countries, some 39 by 1981. While the total was rising, the mix among aid programs was changing. The proportion of development assistance (although still much the largest) was declining, while the share of food aid and Economic Support Fund monies were rising. These changes responded to the growing balance of payments problems (which in part included the rising food import bills) of African countries and to the African need for flexible, fast-dispensing aid programs. Agency for International Development (AID) project aid tended to be slow to develop and implement; funds from ESF and food aid programs were easier to obtain from Congress.

But these figures should not be exaggerated. Even with the substantial increases in United States assistance to Africa during this period, this aid remained a relatively small proportion of total United States bilateral aid, reaching 14 percent in 1981. And United States aid as a proportion of the total aid received by African countries also remained meager, averaging only 7 percent in 1978.[8]

(Continued on page 132)

[7]Drawn from U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), *Congressional Presentations 1977-1982* and U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance,* the same years. The 1982 figures were request levels to Congress.

[8]Statistical tables prepared by AID, drawn from a variety of sources. AFR/DP/PPE: 12-7-78, revised. The 1981 figures are estimated by AID of actual levels for that year. Final figures were not available at the time of this writing.

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"The specter of Soviet assistance and possible direct involvement and the impact of the OAU and its member states may well force the Western world to respond with some sympathy to SWAPO and the nationalist cause in Namibia. The settlement process seems to be back on track, the slow track, but whether it will reach agreement and implementation acceptable to all parties is problematic."

Namibia in International Politics

By Kenneth Grundy
Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University

NAMIBIA is a theater of global rivalry that is growing in significance each year. In this decade, the superpowers have come to regard Namibia as an East-West issue and a human rights–imperialism concern involving the very continuity of some regional states. Namibia has long been an international issue in law and politics.[1]

During World War I, South Africa occupied the territory of South-West Africa, which had been under German control since 1880. After the war, in 1920, the League of Nations gave South Africa a mandate to govern the territory; subsequently, after World War II, South Africa refused to place the territory under United Nations trusteeship. In 1966, the United Nations declared the mandate terminated and subsequently placed the territory under United Nations control. South Africa, however, has refused to comply with various Security Council Resolutions, and negotiations continue to set up an acceptable framework for Namibian independence.

Namibia's 852,000 people are spread over approximately 318,261 square miles, an area twice the size of California. This vast territory, most of which is perennially arid and fit for little more than stock farming, is, nonetheless, an economic prize of some consequence. Its gross domestic product in 1979 reached $1.4 billion. Until a few years ago, exports consisted largely of fish products (a declining industry), some livestock, and pelts (mostly Karakul sheep). It is in the field of mineral exploitation that Namibia's economic future seems so promising. In 1979, Namibia produced about $600-million worth of minerals (diamonds, uranium, copper, vanadium, lead and zinc). Minerals comprised 49 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and two-thirds of its exports, making Namibia Africa's fourth largest mineral exporter (after South Africa, Zaire and Zambia).

But despite the promise of growth and development, the Namibian economy is not healthy. Inflation soars; fishing and agriculture falter; periodic droughts amplify the difficulties; prices fluctuate on key commodities; and unemployment may be as high as 30 percent. The war displaces many people and adds to the existing dislocation of the urbanizing population. Political uncertainties aggravate the financial and investment markets. Despite the pressing short-run problems, Namibia is, as one piece of South African propaganda puts it, a "plum worth the fight."[2]

While control of Namibia's economic resources is important, the contest for military predominance in the territory and its approaches has motivated intrusive actors and neighboring states even more. Namibia borders on Angola, Zambia, Botswana and South Africa, and it shares a theoretical border with Zimbabwe at a midpoint in the Zambezi River. The port at Walvis Bay has military as well as economic utility. Increasingly, policymakers in Pretoria perceive that the installation of a hostile regime in Windhoek would make the maintenance of order in South Africa more difficult. Angola and Zambia, conversely, see such a change as a first step in maintaining their territorial integrity against South African military incursions.

Economic and strategic explanations for the competition over Namibia are relevant. But Namibia is also a symbol. For racist South Africa to continue to rule Namibia or to thwart the southward thrust of black African nationalism is an affront to black Africans. A Marxist government in Namibia would represent a major defeat for South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha's government in Pretoria and would probably lead to his rejection by the white electorate. It would also stand as an encouraging object lesson on the efficacy of armed struggle for South Africa's black people.

Diverse actors have become enmeshed in the Namibian puzzle. None, of course, are more di-

[1]John Dugard, ed., *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy between South Africa and the United Nations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[2]*Namibia News Gazette* (Washington, D.C.), p. 9.

rectly involved than the inhabitants of that troubled land. There are, at present, roughly 100,000 whites and 701,000 black Africans, with an additional 51,000 coloreds and Basters.† The Africans can be divided into eight major ethnic groups, the largest being the 360,000 Ovambos.[3] While all members of these various groups do not uniformly follow the dictates of their racial brethren in the territory of their traditional tribal leaders, it is difficult to follow a middle course or to transcend one's birthright identity.

SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization) has been widely recognized as the only significant national liberation movement in Namibia.[4] Founded in 1960 and currently led by Sam Nujoma, SWAPO is believed to have extensive popular support, particularly in urban centers and among the Ovambos. Although SWAPO is not formally banned or outlawed in Namibia, most of its leaders have been detained, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Those still "free" are harassed by the authorities, and their political activities are carefully monitored. Open coordination between the internal wing (scrupulously nonviolent) and the external wing, which boasts a fighting force of between 6,000 and 8,000 men and women, mostly in not-so-safe sanctuary in Angola, is impossible. The militant faction of SWAPO has been waging a guerrilla war against South Africa's occupying forces and their indigenous agents since 1965. Still, the SWAPO branches struggle on, seeking identical ends: an independent, unitary Namibia in which power is centralized under a government based on the principle of popular majority rule. The ideological basis on which SWAPO defines its conception of the will of the people, however, alarms conservative elements, who fear that SWAPO may not surrender power if, at some future date, it were rebuffed at the polls or lost popular support. In exile, SWAPO intraparty politics has been rough and uncompromising, partly because of the necessity to guard against infiltration by South African informants. This has led to splits in party ranks. In 1978, Andreas Shipanga, who had been detained in Zambia at Nujoma's behest and later imprisoned in Tanzania, formed his SWAPO-Democratic party (SWAPO-D) and returned to Namibia. In 1980, a second faction led by Mishake Muyongo formed the Caprivian African National Union. Still, SWAPO is by far the largest and most popular party in the territory and would easily win over any other single party should free elections be conducted.

DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) is the principal orchestrated voice of somewhat flexible whites and of other ethnic groups, particularly of their traditional and conservative leadership. DTA was established in 1977 after the dissolution of the Turnhalle constitutional conference.[5] The party is an alliance ostensibly representing the territory's 11 main ethnic groups and chaired by Dirk Mudge of the Republican party. It aims to lead Namibia to independence under the tutelege and military protection of South Africa. It hopes to maintain domestic order (and presumably conservative control) by establishing a three-tiered government with a measure of local (ethnic) autonomy in vital aspects of government. This multiracialism, which means a recognition and entrenchment of ethnic separateness, is thought to provide protection for whites. It is rejected summarily by SWAPO. DTA won an overwhelming majority (82 percent) in the South African-supervised "internal" elections in 1978; SWAPO boycotted the vote. DTA went on to dominate the constituent assembly, and currently it wields executive and legislative power in the National Assembly.

In September, 1981, control of day-to-day government was vested in the DTA's multiracial Cabinet. An Administrator-General appointed by Pretoria still retains control over constitutional affairs, the security forces and foreign affairs; he also controls administration and directs the civil service. However, the largely white, South African-led bureaucracy seems to resist implementing DTA-instigated change. Thus, part of DTA's frustration is that its powers to eliminate racial discrimination and domination are limited by a lack of funds and by local white factions still in favor in Pretoria. Nor can DTA prescribe to the National party-dominated white legislative council in the second (provincial) tier of government. The DTA is therefore hamstrung in any electoral contest with SWAPO. It does not have the power to make changes but it is blamed for not making them.

On DTA's right is the South-West Africa branch of South Africa's apartheid National party. The NP advocates ethnic divisions at all levels, not unlike the homelands scheme that has been in force

†People of mixed European-Nama descent.

[3]Population data are from 1974, although racial and tribal proportions have remained fairly constant. Excellent background on the issue can be found in Elizabeth S. Landis and Michael I. Davis, "Namibia: Impending Independence?" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 141-74.

[4]Gerhard Totemeyer, *Namibia Old and New: Traditional and Modern Leaders in Ovamboland* (London: C. Hurst, 1978).

[5]The Turnhalle conference is covered in J. H. P. Serfontein, *Namibia?* (Randburg: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1976) and in International Defence and Aid Fund, *All Options and None: The Constitutional Talks in Namibia* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1976).

in South Africa. The National party resists Mudge's white Republican party and, although it made a comeback in local elections, the NP is a reactionary, spent force. It can dominate white politics, yet it lacks the strength to win wider political power. Therefore, it plays essentially a spoiler's role in the settlement efforts.

The Namibia National Front, an alliance of five parties, is dominated by the Herero-based South-West Africa National Union (SWANU). Other small ethnic parties also function. They are important to the extent that they can chip away at support for SWAPO in an election. The central pieces, however, are SWAPO and DTA, both supported by their respective external partners and mentors.

REGIONAL CONTESTANTS

Namibia is an issue of internal as well as foreign politics in two neighboring states. For Angola, its future is a matter of immediate security. For South Africa, the stabilization of Namibia under a regime that, although reputedly independent, accepts Pretoria's predominant role in the territory, is regarded as vital.

To white South Africans, Namibia is the ultimate buffer. They have seen their hinterland shrink and become more hostile.[6] If Namibia should "fall," South Africa would be surrounded by revisionist states, and the full force of the "onslaught" would be focused and borne directly by South Africans on South African territory. For many, therefore, Namibia is an emblem of the vitality of the South African regime. Pretoria understands that pressures from Africa, Europe and the United States demand a transfer of power in Namibia. The questions that arise are: to whom? and how rapidly?

There is no public document that neatly spells out South Africa's strategic design for Namibia. Ideally, Pretoria would like an "internal" settlement leading to independence under the control of the DTA and safely managed from South Africa. South African leaders realize, furthermore, that it will not be easy to exclude SWAPO entirely from a negotiated settlement, because SWAPO's popularity is undeniable. But much depends on the timing of the transfer. South Africa wants to defeat SWAPO militarily: there is a psychological link between "winning" militarily and a "peace" in Namibia on Pretoria's own terms and at its own pace. South Africa seeks a Namibian solution as part of a larger regional resolution. Hence, Pretoria is not prepared to turn over power to an independent Namibia until the military and political situation in Angola is changed, meaning that Soviet and Cuban forces are withdrawn from Angola or are neutralized and that a government more sympathetic to Pretoria is in place in Luanda.

Preemptive incursions and bombings by South Africa have weakened SWAPO and have immobilized its larger bases in Angola and Zambia. And South Africa has punished these countries by destroying their economic infrastructures and border towns and villages. During these temporary setbacks for SWAPO, Pretoria hopes that Angola and Zambia will pressure SWAPO to be more amenable to settlement terms acceptable to Pretoria and the Western Contact Group.* Pretoria also leans on Angola by trying to secure an international, acceptable role for the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the anti-government Angolan guerrilla movement led by Jonas Savimbi and aided by Pretoria.

Although a purely internal settlement would be unstable, Pretoria prefers only token compromise, a minimum gesture to SWAPO sufficient to defuse the situation and gain acceptability for an incoming pro-Pretoria Namibian regime. Few have been fooled by this strategy, and increasingly South Africa has reverted to a military response. It reasons that the administration of United States President Ronald Reagan is the most sympathetic it can hope for in the West, and that for a while, because of its massive military incursions into Angola in August and September, 1981, it has gained maneuverability that may lead to a further devolution of authority to the DTA. Pretoria also understands that an "internally" independent Namibia would be rather like Transkei, a nominally independent territory within South Africa that has not gained diplomatic recognition by any government except South Africa. How long South Africa can delay is problematic. Dirk Mudge has said that "not even the moderates [in Namibia] are prepared to wait forever for independence."[7]

While most of the South African voters do not follow or react to each set of negotiating proposals and counterproposals, they have made it clear to the politicians that they will hold the government responsible for the establishment of a hostile regime in Windhoek. To reduce that prospect, Pretoria's Nationalists reason that the time is ripe for a counterrevolutionary bias to the Namibia-Angola fabric. Their preferred agenda would include a friendly government in Luanda or, failing that, a secessionist government in southern Angola

*The Contact Group includes the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain and West Germany.

[6]See Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa," in Carter and O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: International Issues and Responses*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), forthcoming.

[7]Quoted in the *Baltimore Sun*, September 4, 1981.

or at least a buffer territory controlled by forces friendly to Pretoria. This would bolster a Namibian government that cooperates with South Africa. The Nationalists know that should they fail, should white safety in Namibia be jeopardized, continued white rule in South Africa itself would be less secure. The National party (NP) would be undermined, and a further swing to the right would follow. Thus, although the Namibian issue has been internationalized, it has also been localized, in the sense that internal South African white politics, especially the *verkrampte* ("narrow-minded")-*verligte* ("enlightened") split in the NP, shapes Pretoria's posture toward Namibia's future. To hand over Namibia to any black government, however moderate, would be difficult enough for a Nationalist government. To hand it over to a Marxist who is portrayed as a stooge of the Soviet Union would be seen as an act of betrayal of the Afrikaners of Namibia and, perforce, of South Africa itself.

Yet the alternative of marking time is hardly more attractive. Military occupation is expensive. South Africa's military commanders have always maintained that although they can contain the military threat, a political solution is imperative.[8] But so far, no political solution has been acceptable to Pretoria. It is not wise to play for time when time is not on your side. Hence, the military is trying to precipitate a round of more acceptable political proposals by forcing the hands of SWAPO, Angola, and the Western states. Pretoria is postponing a political solution while trying to rearrange the balance of forces in the region in order to usher in a pliant regime. While the politicians jockey for position, South Africa's militarists continue to provide their forces with "on-the-job" training. Namibia's value as a "piece of military real estate" has grown. Why defend South Africa at the Orange River when it can be defended on the Cunene or even farther north?[9] Thus a two-track strategy has emerged: to weaken militarily its enemies in Angola and inside Namibia, and to strengthen DTA politically to endow it with wider popularity.

If South African whites regard the Namibian issue as fraught with potential dangers, the Angolans see it as absolutely vital to their immediate territorial integrity, safety, and independence. With its commitment to a military solution, South Africa has made the character of the Angolan regime an issue in the Namibian puzzle. As a result, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government is fighting for its existence.[10] For this reason Angola's leaders regard any assistance from any source as indispensable. Since Namibian independence under a "progressive" black government is a moral imperative, they will not easily retreat from their support for SWAPO or from Cuban assistance.

But there are other practical considerations. The existence of a unified Angolan state is at stake. A good deal depends on how one interprets the August-September, 1981, South African invasion of Angola. First indications were that the massive strike was launched to wipe out SWAPO bases and thereby to immobilize the insurgency against Namibia. In the earlier stages of the war, this was the pattern. SWAPO had established large bases just inside the Angola border. South Africa repeatedly crossed the border to strike at these bases and, in self-defense, SWAPO withdrew deeper into the Angolan bush and split into smaller camps. Not content with a decentralized SWAPO, South Africa raided deeper into Angola, sometimes more than 100 miles and for days at a time. It also created a special battalion of Portuguese speakers (mostly former National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FLNA, fighters) especially for cross-border operations.

The Angolans responded by fighting alongside SWAPO. To reduce South African air bombardment, Angola reportedly established a defensive radar system linked to Soviet-made SAM antiaircraft missiles farther to the north, around Lubango and Moçamedes. Later references to these radar installations hampering air strikes in support of SADF (South African Defense Forces) ground forces provided a second excuse and interpretation. According to Pretoria, the Angolans were "interfering" in operations that were aimed not at the Angolan armed forces but against "terrorism." Angola, somehow, was to ignore the fact that this fighting was occurring on Angolan soil.

It is also possible to argue that because Angola knew well in advance of Pretoria's preparations, and because Angola and the SWAPO forces had practically evacuated the border areas, South Africa was following an altogether different agenda. Whereas the earlier interpretations might be labeled "little interventionist" theories, with definite and narrow military objectives, the later explanations might be termed "big interventionist" theories.

Four possibilities might be advanced. First, the South Africans were seeking to destabilize the whole Angolan political and economic system. Second, Pretoria knew of the presence of Soviet advisers in the region and was seeking to capture

[8]*The Star*, Weekly Air Edition, August 15, 1981, p. 13.

[9]John de St. Jorre, "South Africa: Is Change Coming?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 1 (fall, 1981), pp. 119-20.

[10]On SADF destruction of civilian targets see *The Guardian*, January 29 and February 2, 1981.

Soviet soldiers or bring back Soviet bodies, "trophies" to prove to the world the extent of Soviet bloc involvement. This, it was felt, might force the United States hand in supporting South Africa materially. (The South Africans succeeded in capturing a Soviet sergeant, killing four Russians, and returning with a mountain of captured weapons.)

Third, and related to the efforts at destabilization, the South Africans may have taken to heart Israel's example of "defensive occupation" of neighboring territory—to be occupied by either the SADF, the South-West Africa Territory Force, or UNITA fighters. An article in the *Windhoek Advertiser,* published on June 29, 1979, proposed this course, along the lines of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon in league with Major Saad Haddad's Lebanese Christian militia. On August 10, 1981, Major-General Charles Lloyd, commander of the SADF in Namibia, had intimated that South Africa was preparing for a "conventional war" on the Namibian-Angolan frontier. Why not, in concert with UNITA (which South Africa supports with funds, material and military collaboration), move the effective boundary northward? In addition to added defense in depth, South Africa would gain greater bargaining leverage and would facilitate UNITA's establishment of a regime in an area heretofore denied it.

Fourth, and perhaps less expansively, a military setback for SWAPO and Angola might be seen as a preliminary step before international negotiations over Namibia. There is a parallel in Rhodesia's cross-border strikes into Zambia and Mozambique before the Lancaster House talks, which might have helped to persuade those governments to pressure the Patriotic Front to agree to talks and to accept a compromise settlement.

"Big intervention" can take place best in a cold war global atmosphere. Hence, Pretoria had a second aim of exposing and documenting direct Soviet involvement in the war. Pretoria realizes that the Reagan administration is particularly impressed by such evidence and that each "proof" of Soviet military assistance increases the chances of direct United States military aid to South Africa and to its Angolan ally, UNITA.

GLOBAL ACTORS

In 1977, a military stalemate was reached between the SWAPO forces and the security forces of South Africa. The governments of Great Britain, France, the United States, Canada and West Germany, anxious to break the deadlock and usher in a more peaceful transition in Namibia, formed a diplomatic "contact group" to mediate among Pretoria, the Turnhalle conferees, and SWAPO and its allies in the front-line states, and to attempt to draw the United Nations into the settlement. Although several detailed proposals and counterproposals have been advanced by the various parties, most negotiations currently center on three issues: One, the diplomatic device of an internationally supervised election open to all Namibian elements and supervised by United Nations observers; two, the military issues of cease-fire, military roles (including one for a United Nations peacekeeping force) during the election and transition to an internationally acceptable independence; and three, the constitutional structure and content of the new order.

In 1978, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 435, ostensibly accepted by SWAPO and South Africa. It seeks to implement a Contact Group plan for United Nations-supervised elections, and remains the basis for a negotiated settlement in Namibia. The South African government maintains that it has not rejected Resolution 435. Rather, it contends that delays in its implementation result from deviations from the original, presumably agreed-on, United Nations proposals. In Pretoria's view, the United Nations has not been an honest broker in the sense that it cannot fairly referee a contest in which it has already taken sides by recognizing SWAPO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people" (so stated in a 1973 General Assembly resolution). This "collective legitimization" gives SWAPO electoral and propagandistic advantages.[11]

After the 1981 Geneva conference's failure to arrive at an agreement, the fact that action could not be initiated until the Reagan administration was in place was generally accepted. By August, the United States had reactivated the Contact Group, and the various actors watched as the Reagan administration, through statement, gesture and policy shift, began to fashion a posture of its own on southern Africa. Most observers saw an

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[11]Christopher Coker, "Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: The United Nations and Namibia," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* vol. 19, no. 2 (July, 1981), pp. 174-86.

"Nigeria is a vigorous nation, with able and ambitious leaders. . . . But the ability of President Shagari and the state governors to cope with Nigeria's problems is dependent on satisfying the extraordinarily high expectations for jobs and material improvements that petronaira [petro dollars], the visible affluence of the few, and political promises have inspired."

Nigeria Under Shagari

BY JON KRAUS

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AFTER 13 years of military rule, Nigeria's return to a civilian democracy in October, 1979, made it the world's fourth largest democracy, with well over 80 million people. Nigeria's cultural and ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity, its recent civil war (1967-1969), its impoverished people, and its adoption of new political institutions all render Nigeria's attempt to adopt democratic institutions in a continent with few democracies a matter of consuming interest.

Equally important, how has Nigeria employed the bonanzas from its production and export of oil starting in the late 1960's and the extraordinary oil price increases of 1973-1974 and 1979? Does this abundant capital eliminate crucial constraints on economic development and incipient industrialization in a large market? Is the incredible windfall affluence of oil-exporting countries likely to give rise to sustained development? Or will it lead to regression in previously productive sectors, massive consumption, vastly increased inequality, and heightened political and class conflict? Finally, can Nigeria's new political institutions cope with such conflicts when oil gluts and price cuts sharply reduce state revenues, the condition Nigeria confronts in 1981 and 1982?

Some measures of growth in the Nigerian economy in the 1960's and 1970's indicate phenomenal change, while others reflect areas of stagnation, the costs of change and lost opportunities. Gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 7.5 percent annually during 1970-1979, industry increased 11.2 percent (of which manufacturing increased 11.8 percent), but agriculture declined by 0.3 percent per annum. From 1969-1971 to 1977-1979, the average index of food production per capita declined by 13 percent. A drastic change in the structure of production during 1960-1979, fueled by oil exports and price increases, disguised the stagnation or slow progress of productive sectors.

Agriculture dropped from 63 percent to 22 percent of GDP, with previous major export crops like palm oil and groundnuts imported. And cocoa and food production declined, which generated huge increased food imports during the 1970's. Manufacturing remained at 5 percent of a greatly increased GDP between 1960 and 1979, while services, especially commerce and government employment, increased from 26 percent to 33 percent of GDP.

Public (government) consumption rose by 24 percent during 1970-1979 compared with 1960-1970, gross domestic investment by 141 percent, and private consumption by 473 percent, which suggests the size of the spending spree by the government and especially the individual Nigerians who came into naira (Nigerian currency) during the 1970's. The average annual growth rate in imports during 1970-1979 was 20.6 percent. The majority of Nigerians, the 55 percent of the labor force that still earned their living or subsistence through agriculture, did not share greatly in this bounty, although food prices were rising.[1]

Perhaps Nigeria's most important investment during the 1970's and the one with the greatest egalitarian possibilities (also likely to reduce infant and child mortality rates) was the federal military government's decision to introduce free universal primary education, which required a drastic expansion of opportunities for secondary, teacher training, and college education. Increases in school attendance at all levels was phenomenal: in 1980, federal educational expenditures were 14.3 percent of total federal expenditures, the largest single item.

A major International Labor Organization (ILO) study of Nigeria's economy concluded in 1981 that after two decades of rapid economic growth,

[1]In contrast, although Ghana's economy stagnated and regressed during the 1960-1979 period while Nigeria's grew rapidly, Nigeria was unable to increase life expectancy at birth (which went from 39 to 49) or reduce the child death rate, ages one to four (36 to 22 per thousand) any faster than Ghana. Data drawn from World Bank, *World Development Report, 1981* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

> there should be by now signs of substantial improvements in the living conditions of the majority of the Nigerian people. These are not evident.[2]

The ILO report observed the breakdown of urban services like water supplies, electricity, decent roads, and safety from armed robbery—an enormous problem. The extremely high rates of public investment have not gone into essential services like health or housing, nor to agriculture, which was allocated less than 7 percent of federal budget spending during the 1970's. Water supplies and housing have lagged behind population and urban growth, while sanitation has been neglected. The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) acts suddenly and arbitrarily, cutting off electricity in homes, hospitals, and the National Assembly. Inflation rose dramatically during the 1970's: the Lagos retail price index indicated a 100 percent rise during 1974-1976, 30 percent in 1977, 40 percent in 1978. Inflation moderated some to 11.4 percent and 10.2 percent in 1979-1980 by the official composite consumer price index. But a government wage freeze was in effect between 1976 and 1980, so inflation drastically eroded the real incomes of wage earners.

Several major patterns in Nigeria's development in the 1970's may be briefly observed. First, Nigeria's prodigious growth during the 1970's was stoked by oil revenues; when these stop or decline, so does growth. By 1974, oil earnings constituted 92 percent of Nigeria's exports by value, over 75 percent of federal revenue, over 80 percent of total government (federal and state) revenue. Between 1966 and 1974, oil production increased fivefold, while the value of oil exports increased 30 times. Production peaked at 2.3 million barrels a day (mbd) in 1974, with production in 1979-1980 at around 2 mbd. Moreover, the Nigerian federal government captured a large share of the profits from the increased production and the price hikes. It nationalized an equity share of 60 percent of all foreign oil companies in Nigeria in the early 1970's and holds 80 percent of the joint Shell/British Petroleum production (since it nationalized BP's 20 percent share in 1979). It captures a large portion of the oil companies' 40 percent share through a 20 percent royalty and 85 percent tax. Indeed, so tightly has it squeezed oil company profit margins that major companies ignored Nigeria's offerings of acreage for new drilling in 1979 because of Nigeria's terms.[3]

Second, it is in large measure government expenditures that fueled Nigeria's economic expansion during the 1970's. Apart from the extremely high military budget in the 1970's (whose percentage share has now been reduced), several trends are significant. Total federal revenue increased dramatically from 1973-1974 on, except in 1978-1979 (when an oil glut reduced exports). But popular and elite demands for immediate benefits were so powerful and government leaders were so confident that revenues would increase unendingly that within one year after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 the government was spending more than it received in revenue. Government deficits as a percentage of federally retained revenue (part goes to the states) were high: 28.4 percent in 1975-1976, 25 percent in 1976-1977, 30.4 percent in 1977-1978, 56.1 percent in 1978-1979 (when the oil glut contracted federal revenue by 18.5 percent), 51.7 percent in 1979-1980, and a decline to 22 percent in 1980 under the new civilian government, even though revenues had increased by 79.1 percent.[4]

The point is clear: Nigerian governments have consistently run deficits despite huge revenue increases, finding it extremely difficult to scale down popular and elite demands for services and contracts. When the government was forced to cut expenditures sharply in 1978-1979, it faced high levels of popular and elite dissatisfaction, increased conflict over the division of revenues, and widespread student dissidence and rioting over increased fees and inadequate facilities. One Nigerian observer characterized these expressions of frustrated aspirations as those of an *ajofe* society, a parasitic, free-loading society whose members (especially the elite) believe that they have unconditional rights to resources without responsibilities.[5] The new civilian government must cope with these frustrations.

In Nigeria, federal revenue is divided among 19 constituent states, local government areas, and the federal government. The first two receive most of their revenues from the federal government's petronaira. The precise division of federal revenues has been one of the most controversial subjects in federal-state relations. The federal government has tended to promote development through massive projects in industry, transport and communications and, less frequently, agriculture. This has increased its tendency to finance capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive projects, thus generat-

[2]International Labor Organization, *First Things First, Meeting the Basic Needs of the People of Nigeria* (Geneva: ILO, 1981).

[3]See Martin Quinlan, "Prospecting for Oil in Nigeria" and "Increasing Profits from Nigerian Oil," *West Africa,* May 26, 1980, pp. 913-14, and June 2, 1980, pp. 957-58.

[4]Data calculated from L. Rupley, "Nigeria's Nine-Month Budget," *West Africa,* May 12, 1980, p. 821.

[5]Ladun Anise, "Confrontation Politics and Crisis Management: Nigerian University Students and Public Policy," *Issue,* vol. 9, no. 1-2 (spring-summer, 1979), p. 74.

ing less employment, to provide big projects outside the scope of Nigerian contractors and skill levels, and to finance large agro-industry projects by elites and companies that could provide security for bank loans.

Small peasant producers whose access to improved technologies, seeds and fertilizer are essential for raising food production have been largely ignored, because of the types of projects pursued and the failure of states to implement small farmer projects when credit was made available.[6] Absentee landlord farming by businessmen and civil servants with access to bank loans has increased. The government of President Shehu Shagari has greatly increased expenditures for agriculture, which rose from 7.2 percent of federal budget expenditures in 1979-1980 to 11.3 percent in 1980, with an estimated rise of 12.7 percent in 1981. New programs will place a major emphasis on small farmers, but these have yet to bear fruit.

A NEW AFFLUENT CLASS

This emphasizes the fact that a relatively small percentage of Nigerians and foreign capital have benefited from the patterns of government spending, while the standard of living of many Nigerians has declined. A whole new class of state-created capitalists and middlemen have been produced by government contracts, import licenses, commerce, and massive corruption. Of course, many honest Nigerians labor for the common good. But the crass materialism in Nigerian life is infectious; the desire to cash in on the possibilities for wealth is pervasive and blatant. Great wealth is to be made by inserting oneself in the network of trade, in cloth, rice, flour, appliances, or jewelry (banned as an import in 1979 and smuggled, like lace). Increased government regulations increase the possibilities for corruption. The last military head of state, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, charged in 1977 that Nigerians "are fast becoming a nation of agents and middlemen, with the attendant easy money and corruption."

But the state itself has fathered a new capitalist class. In the indigenization program by which foreign capitalists were required (according to size and sector) to sell 40 percent, 60 percent, or 100 percent of their equity to Nigerians, the state ordered banks to extend credit to Nigerians to purchase these shares. By mid-1979, the fortunate few—the importers, contractors, lawyers, businessmen and academics—who obtained bank loans had acquired over 500 million shares in 1,858 companies valued (actually undervalued) at $736 million. Dividends were high; the risk was negligible. The state served as the creator of large-scale domestic capital and as an intermediary between domestic and foreign private capital, where political ties and access to state power were and remain crucial. Senior civil servants and politicians serving under the military and later the civilian government simultaneously acted as senior public officials, board members of affiliates of multinational corporations and investors in local stocks and industries.

Little has changed under civilian rule; when 1980 restrictions on imported rice tripled the market price, National Assembly demands for the names of licensed importers revealed record and electronics companies as well as the deputy leader of the House and the Senate leader.

Lastly, Nigerian governments have sought to stimulate development through increased Nigerian control and import-substitution industrialization, which is reasonable enough given a domestic market of over 80 million people. Several points may be noted. While the economically nationalist indigenization program reserved to the federal government (by itself or in conjunction with multinationals), basic utilities, natural resources and the largest industries, it also had the effect of legitimizing remaining foreign capital equity and giving entrepreneurs and others windfall wealth through foreign share purchases at undervalued prices. Second, despite extensive attempts to promote Nigerian entrepreneurs, there is substantial evidence that Nigerian businessmen prefer to enter fields where the turnover is rapid and profits are high (commerce, domestic or import, transport, and real estate) or as speculators or rentiers, where their profits are extremely high.[7] They prefer these sectors to the longer term investments required in agriculture and manufacturing (where profits have also been lucrative).[8] The preferred sectors contribute little to production and add to conspicuous consumption and the visibility of inequality. And finally, the market forces that have generated import-substitution have created industries that tend to produce consumer durables and nondurables for that small group of Nigerians whose wealth is highly concentrated.

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[6] Okello Oculi, "Dependent Food Policy in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 15-16 (May-December, 1979), pp. 64-74.

[7] Bill Freund, "Oil Boom and Crisis in Contemporary Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 13 (September-December, 1978), p. 98, on trade profits; Sayre Schatz, *Nigerian Capitalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chapters 3-5; Richard Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 16, no. 2 (June, 1978), pp. 224-30.

[8] A survey of 70 manufacturing companies in Nigeria shows an average annual profit between 1975 and 1980 of 39 percent of equity before tax, 20 percent after tax. David Cotton, "Business for Development," *West Africa,* September 28, 1981, p. 2240.

NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Nigeria's return to civilian rule involved a protracted process of military disengagement and the creation of new political institutions. Nigerians adopted a presidential system based on the United States model. Their leaders were anxious to strengthen national unity to prevent the return of the ethnic-regional cleavages that convulsed the first republic. This preoccupation led to constitutional provisions that a federal Cabinet must include a minister from each state and that successful presidential candidates must receive not only the most votes but at least one-fourth of the vote in two-thirds of the 19 states (with a similar provision for governors with regard to local council areas). A failure would lead to a run-off election. An independent Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) enforced regulations that only parties with national representation would be registered.

The results of the five separate elections in Nigeria in mid-1979 (for President, state governors, state assemblies, Senate, House) showed pronounced ethnic-regional voting patterns reminiscent of 1960's elections but involving a greater complexity of alliances across ethnic-state lines. The division of Nigeria into 19 states to replace the three regions dominated by the parties of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo (the largest ethnic/cultural clusters) in the first republic gave new political bases to smaller (or minority) ethnic groups, with which the leaders of the three largest peoples had to ally themselves. Ethnic and sub-ethnic voting patterns reflect trust in one's own people and the politicians' need to develop secure bases in competition for the power, status and material resources of the state rather than tribal sentiment. Electoral competition involved for the most part not issue or ideological differences but the politics of distribution leading to promises to establish new states and provide communities with housing, schools, colleges, roads, jobs and free education.

The party most successful in building multistate/ethnic alliances was the National party of Nigeria (NPN), formed by a group of "heavy-weights" from the core Hausa-Fulani states in the north plus southern leaders allied with minorities in the northern Middle Belt and in one area in the west and two in the southeast. It was the only genuinely national party, electing Senators from 10 of the 19 states, House members from 16 of the 19, and winning the presidential vote in 9 states and coming in second in another 9. As its presidential candidate, the NPN selected Shehu Shagari, a former schoolteacher, Northern People's Congress leader in the first republic, and federal minister under military rule.

The Unity party of Nigeria (UPN) is centered on Yoruba people of western Nigeria, led by the ambitious Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 72-year-old-leader of the Yoruba Action Group party in the 1960's, a lawyer, entrepreneur, and self-styled (large landholding) socialist. The UPN dominates its core area of support more than any other party.

Nnamdi Azikiwe, father of Nigerian nationalism, President of the first republic and at that time leader of the largely Ibo party, emerged from retirement to join and win leadership in the Nigerian People's party (NPP). The NPP's core support lies among the Ibo in Anambra and Imo states; it formed successful alliances with minorities in Plateau state and won scattered votes and assembly seats elsewhere. Millionaire businessman Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim led a splinter out of the NPP when he was denied its leadership and founded the Great Nigerian People's party (GNPP), whose core support lies among the Kanuri in Nigeria's northeast (Bornu and Gongola states), and which could elicit only minor support in other northern and one southern state. Alhaji Aminu Kano, a renowned champion of the *talakawa* (subject, or lower, class) Hausa in the north formed the People's Redemption party (PRP), which developed support only in Kano and Kaduna states in the north. It is the only party whose leaders hold radical populist views.

Bitter political dispute attended the return to civilian rule, because the NPN's Shagari won 33.8 percent of the presidential vote but one-fourth of the vote in only 12 of the 19 states, less than the prescribed two-thirds. FEDECO's decision that two-thirds of 19 states could be achieved with two-thirds of 18 plus two-thirds of one-fourth of the vote in the thirteenth state secured Shagari's election and enraged the UPN and Chief Awolowo, who unsuccessfully appealed FEDECO's ruling to the Supreme Court. Awolowo and the UPN in effect declined to recognize Shehu Shagari as President, with the result that Shagari's NPN concluded a working accord with Azikiwe's NPP to establish a majority in the National Assembly. This reinforced Awolowo and the UPN in their belief that they might be frozen out of national power as they were during the first republic.

PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

The character of Nigeria's new presidential institutions, the multiplicity of its parties, and their new roles in a presidential system have led to problems in governing Nigeria that have been compounded by leadership animosities, the bitter confrontational style of Nigerian politics, and the profound gulf between Nigeria's bourgeois political leaders—businessmen, lawyers, and other

professionals—and the mass of impoverished Nigerians. Five major problems may be noted: conflict between the President and the coequal National Assembly and the governors and their assemblies; conflict between the federal government and the states; conflict within the parties between leaders holding office and party leaders (the four losing presidential candidates) not in office; the tendency of parties dominant in each state to secure their political bases by eliminating opposition strength; and the demand by groups within states to create new states.

Powerful movements have arisen in many areas demanding the creation of new states out of existing ones since civilian rule returned. The agitation for state status is based in part on the grievances of minority ethnic or sub-ethnic communities, who believe that their status, power and development needs have been subordinated or neglected by majority groups and by the material bonanza to any new state through federal revenue allocations. Nigeria became independent with 3 regions, which were altered to 12 states in 1967 and 19 in 1975 to create a basis for new unity. Elaborate constitutional provisions, requiring multiple two-thirds approvals by the Senate, House, state assembly, and local areas involved, will complicate new state creation, which will be impossible without the agreement of all political parties. The NPN ran for office with the promise to consider new states and by mid-1980 there were appeals for 14 new states, by late 1981 for some 38 new states.[9] New groups have mushroomed to support such demands, creating popular movements, raising funds, and generating support and enormous expectations, many of which will be frustrated in the next year or so when major decisions will have to be made.

POPULIST DEMANDS, COMMUNAL STRIFE

The major organized expression of protest against Nigeria's inequality flows from the Nigerian Labor Congress (NCL) and its 42 constituent unions, with several million members, although they do not represent the rural poor and the urban unemployed and underemployed. In 1976, the military government froze all government wages, a policy followed by much of the private sector as well. It also eliminated vehicle loans and basic allowances to civil servants, who were irritated by these actions. Demands for the restoration of civil servant privileges and an increase in the minimum wage from ₦60 to ₦300 per month were made by the NLC in a series of ultimatums (with deadlines) to a generally nonresponsive federal government in early 1980. Shagari rejected the demand for ₦300 per month (₦3,600 p.a.), which was ₦600 more per year than was paid to college graduates entering the civil service. Shagari increased the minimum wage in April, 1980, to ₦100 per month, which failed to redress the 1976-1979 real wage decline. The NLC rejected this and launched a broadly successful two-day general strike in May, 1981. After the normal delays, the government persuaded the National Assembly to approve an increase to ₦125, or about ₦150 with allowances.[10]

The worker militance that was expressed by the general strike was only one indication of an upsurge of labor protest in 1980-1981, fed by the vast visible inequalities in Nigeria's urban centers. Such inequalities inspire even the reasonably well paid to act on their grievances, as the Senior Staff Association of NEPA did in cutting electricity to Nigeria's major cities for three days in December, 1980, to support their demands for salary increases of 133 percent. To weaken the labor movement and its ability to mount protests, the government has introduced legislation to permit a group of dissatisfied union leaders in the Marxist-led NLC to launch a new labor federation and to change the check-off law from the choice of opting out to voluntary participation in order to diminish the financial strength of the unions.

Rapid socioeconomic change, conspicuous consumption, urban misery and strong traditionality are unleashing social strains. In December, 1980, a small Islamic sect in Kano, which had been vigorously proselytizing among urban immigrants and opposing materialism and privilege, went on an armed rampage, which was subdued only when the army shelled an urban quarter, leading to hundreds of deaths. In mid-1981, Kano Governor Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, PRP, who regards the emirates as semifeudal, oppressive institutions, sent a provocative letter to the Emir of Kano; news of its insults incited violent protests against government buildings and staff, the governor's residence, and the state assembly. In Kwara state, an ambitious Commissioner of Education inspired deep resentment among Christian leaders by insisting that the overwhelming majority of admissions to state-aided, church-owned secondary schools should be

(*Continued on page 136*)

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[9]See *West Africa,* August 11, 1980, pp. 1479-80 and September 21, 1981, pp. 2161-62.

[10]See Alex Rondos, "Nigeria's Minimum Wage Debate," *West Africa,* June 29, 1981, pp. 1453-54.

Jon Kraus's most recent publications include "Strikes and Labor Power in a Post-Colonial African State," in *Development and Change,* April, 1979; "The Political Economy of Conflict in Ghana," *Africa Report,* March-April, 1980; and "American Foreign Policy in Africa," *Current History,* March, 1981.

"Mozambique's resources, its strategic location along the West's oil route from the Persian Gulf and its proximity to the embattled South African regime make it a country worthy of attention. But what excites interest is its sweeping adoption of marxism as a means to develop its economy."

Mozambique: The Enemy Within

By Thomas H. Henriksen

Research Fellow, Hoover Institution

THE People's Republic of Mozambique was hatched from a revolutionary cannonball. Mozambique won its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a 10-year guerrilla struggle (1964-1974). The defeat of Portuguese colonialism marked not only another validation of guerrilla tactics over conventional warfare but also the ascendancy of a revolutionary Marxist movement in southeastern Africa. Because of its all-embracing commitment to a Marxist vision in an African setting, Mozambique has become the focus of attention from foreign governments, political observers, sympathizers and detractors.[1]

Mozambique is located near the foot of the continent and it stretches along the Indian Ocean for 1,700 miles. Its harbors—Nacala, Beira and Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques)—are among the finest in Africa; these ports enhance Mozambique's revenues, because they serve as gateways to the Indian Ocean for the landlocked states of Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. This "Y"-shaped country is cut almost in half by one of the continent's principal rivers, the Zambezi. About 40 percent of Mozambique is lowlands and marshes, the natural habitat of the tsetse fly, which has been a scourge to the land's people and animals for centuries.

Mozambique's natural endowment is plentiful, but most of it has yet to be exploited. Large amounts of coal are mined and exported to Japan and Romania. Small valuable quantities of columbite-tantalite are sold. Sizable fields of natural gas remain to be tapped. Abundant hydroelectric power from the massive Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi exceeds Mozambique's requirements. The bulk of the power is transmitted to the Republic of South Africa, which also uses the port of Maputo, despite Mozambique's sharp criticism of the white government's racial policy. Mozambique's own population of 12 million is preponderantly Bantu speaking but is divided ethnically into 10 major groups. After decolonization, less than 20,000 Portuguese settlers remained, remnants of a preindependence Portuguese population of a quarter of a million.

MARXISM IN AN AFRICAN SETTING

Mozambique's resources, its strategic location along the West's oil route from the Persian Gulf and its proximity to the embattled South African regime make it a country worthy of attention. But what excites interest is its sweeping adoption of marxism as a means to develop its economy. Marxist movements have come to power in other third world lands and have faced the problem of what constitutes "socialist development." Marx and Engels envisioned that capitalism would build the productive infrastructure in the West's industrially advanced states. Then socialist forces could take over and rationalize the industrial production to attain humane conditions for workers and non-workers. Unexpectedly for the Marxian scenario, history veered in the opposite direction, and Marx's programs emerged first in an economically backward land—Tsarist Russia. Other violent Communist revolutions succeeded in even more underdeveloped countries. Mozambique's revolution is no departure from the rule except in the degreee of underdevelopment compared even to China or Cuba. Characterized in Marxist terms, much of Mozambique's socioeconomic development still is at a pre-bourgeois, or even pre-feudal, stage.

Since independence, Mozambique has been ruled by the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) which waged the successful war against Portugal. Founded as a front to combine three small parties, FRELIMO evolved into a Marxist movement during the struggle as radical elements took over the leadership. In 1973, the last year of the war, FRELIMO began organizing party committees, and in 1977 its third party con-

[1]For a survey of Mozambique's history, see Thomas H. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (London: Rex Collings, 1978).

gress transformed the movement into a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard party."[2]

The revolutionary war experience made a profound imprint on FRELIMO, which seeks to use it as model and guide for Mozambican society and life. The lessons learned in the war are to be applied in "the building of socialism." FRELIMO, for example, frequently invokes the wartime slogan *a luta continua* ("the struggle continues") to mobilize support for future tasks.

Among all the wartime experiences, FRELIMO looks to the "liberated zones" for direction in building a socialist-type society. These liberated zones, guerrilla-dominated regions, in the remote northern area of the country provided local services to the inhabitants that led to the FRELIMO belief that it was administering an embryo independent state. FRELIMO cadres organized village political committees, judicial structures, crop growing schemes, people's shops, rudimentary schools and health services along collectivist and cooperative lines. Across the northern border in Tanzania, FRELIMO operated more elaborate cooperative institutions in its sanctuary bases. Free from Portuguese military interference, these institutions furnished models of collectivized life.

In the liberated zones and sanctuary bases, the revolutionaries laid the foundations for their brave new society, including FRELIMO's pervasiveness in politics and life, its egalitarianism, women's liberation, cooperative agriculture and collectivist workplaces. Given this legacy, on coming to power the revolutionaries sought to implement socialist goals, not just with Marxist-Leninist texts but also with the experiences and inspiration of the liberated zones.

When FRELIMO assumed power on June 25, 1975, after a nine-month joint transition period with Portuguese officials, it moved unhesitatingly to institutionalize the revolution and to sweep away traditional and colonial society. The new government criticized traditional leaders, religious practices, tribal initiation rites, brideprice, women's subordinate status and old economic patterns and attacked what it perceived as the colonial vices of alcoholism, prostitution and individualism.

FRELIMO strove—and still strives—to create a "new man," spreading socialist values through an extensive literacy program for young and old and through mass organizations for youth, women and some professionals. It struck at private enterprise by taking over processing plants, plantations and transportation networks, although many were not nationalized until the owners fled from fear of African retribution or government policies. FRELIMO also nationalized schools, apartment houses, church properties and even the services of doctors, lawyers and morticians. It set up people's shops to sell consumer items and food. To operate the railways, plantations and factories, FRELIMO founded committees and workers production councils to run them independently or to assist the remaining managers.

COLLECTIVIZATION

In the countryside, the authorities extolled the benefits and virtues of communal life and agriculture over the traditional small, scattered village way of raising crops and tending livestock. Communal villages, as outlined in FRELIMO proposals, are intended to increase cash crop production for city dwellers as well as food for the villagers by bringing together about 1,250 families, or about 7,000 inhabitants (some villages are larger or smaller than this). In the model villages, FRELIMO plans envisage centralizing facilities for education, health and social services. Another goal of the communal villages is to stem the flow of population from the countryside to the urban areas—a problem that plagues most of the continent, straining sanitation and social services and depriving the rural areas of labor.

To facilitate resettlement of sometimes reluctant rural dwellers into the new communal system, FRELIMO first used the wartime resettlement villages, or *aldeamentos*, of the Portuguese military forces. Next it took advantage of natural disasters like the 1977 floods in the Limpopo Basin to regroup many inhabitants of Gaza Province into 52 communal villages, some with as many as 4,500 people. Most recently, government officials have taken to the upcountry regions to praise the advantages of communal living. So far no evidence of the kind of forced collectivization that occurred in Cambodia or to a far lesser extent in Tanzania has reached the outside world.

Collectivization and workers' control also provide the basis for the rapid industrialization of Mozambique. At FRELIMO's third party congress, the party articulated a program of "making the building of heavy industry the decisive factor in the break with misery and imperialist domination."[3] FRELIMO hopes to achieve industrial self-sufficiency to the level of manufacturing its own tractors by the end of the century.

REALISM AND REVOLUTION

Soon after independence, FRELIMO's heady plans encountered setbacks attributable to the government's foreign and domestic policies as well as

[2] For more on this topic, see *Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO* (London: Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre, 1978).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

to climatic reverses. The heavy rains and floods that followed independence turned to drought, and Mozambicans sarcastically quipped that "when the Portuguese left, they took the rain." Crops withered, livestock died and agricultural output slumped, causing the government to import large amounts of wheat to feed the population. Other internal problems buffeted the economy. The flight of the Portuguese settlers with their skills and financial capital undermined production and industrial investment. Unaccustomed to managerial roles, Mozambicans could not fill the gap; others turned to profiteering and black market trade.

Signs of deterioration and neglect appeared everywhere. Vehicles stopped functioning for lack of mechanics and spare parts; sewage lines ruptured beneath the capital's streets; and elevators either did not move or became unsafe. Agricultural production tumbled so much that the third congress endorsed the central committee report on economic and social guidelines that set forth a four-year target of regaining pre-independence peak levels of 1973 crop output by 1980. Cashews, cotton and sugar crops have improved since 1977, but only tea production has approached the 1973 level. The declining production and the need to import foodstuffs along with machinery and other items caused a balance of payments deficit of $200 million in 1980.

Foreign policy decisions also contributed to Mozambique's economic woes. In March, 1976, Maputo closed its borders to traffic with the settler regime in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to support the struggle of Zimbabwean nationalists. The stoppage of transit fees for the Rhodesian use of Mozambique's railways and Beira's port accounted for a FRELIMO-estimated $175 million-$200 million of Maputo's $300 million yearly balance of trade deficit during the war. With the loss of employment in the transportation sector, Beira became a virtual ghost town.

Additionally, the FRELIMO government allowed Zimbabwean guerrillas to operate from bases on Mozambican soil. This decision cost Mozambique heavily. The Rhodesian white settler regime led by Prime Minister Ian Smith responded by devastating Mozambique's economic infrastructure. It launched counterstrikes against Zimbabwean guerrilla bases across the frontier and it destroyed Mozambique's communication routes, warehouses, fuel tanks, freight cars and trucks. The counterraids peaked in 1979 with total damage valued at $26 million in that year. Timed to coincide with the Lancaster House negotiations in London, which brought about the end of Rhodesian rule in early 1980, Salisbury's military strikes raised havoc in Mozambique's "breadbasket corridor," along the Limpopo Valley agro-industrial complex. FRELIMO's outward support of the Zimbabwean cause never wavered, but the scale of the Rhodesian raids probably caused Maputo to pressure the nationalists into concluding negotiations with Britain's Foreign Secretary to bring about the Rhodesian settlement.[4]

The end of the Rhodesian war and the emergence of a friendly government in the new Zimbabwe* has not resulted in peace within Mozambique's west central area as was anticipated. A legacy of the Zimbabwean war continues to disrupt the region and attract FRELIMO's attention. Anti-FRELIMO dissidents banded together soon after independence to form what has now become known as the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RNM). During the Zimbabwean war, the RNM operated in the west central province of Manica and drew support from the Rhodesian army as well as South Africa and conservative elements in Portugal. Unexpectedly, the end of the Rhodesian regime did not result in a collapse of the RNM's sabotage activities. Receiving some unacknowledged logistical aid from Pretoria, it also receives local support from certain villages to carry out train derailments, bridge mining and attacks on FRELIMO military posts. The intensity of the RNM's raids caused so much concern in Maputo that Mozambique entered into a security pact with Zimbabwe in October, 1980, to allow FRELIMO forces to pursue guerrilla bands into Zimbabwean territory.

Opposition to FRELIMO's rule brought about a change in Mozambique's initial decision to abandon capital punishment. During the last couple of years, the military tribunals have regularly handed down death sentences. For example, a military tribunal in Chimoio, Manica, condemned to death five RNM members in September, 1981.[5] The harsh punishments have so far failed to stamp out resistance to Maputo. Such reprisals are unlikely to crush the rebellion in the near future, for the RNM is made up of black and white troops who once served under Portuguese colors. Their enmity toward FRELIMO and their successful sabotage campaign to date are likely to sustain a smoldering brush war for some time to come. Their chance for ultimate victory, however, appears slim at present.

Mozambique's problems of the last half decade

*For more on the new Zimbabwe see the articles by Virginia Knight and John Harbeson in this issue.

[4]For more on the Rhodesian war, see L. H. Gann and Thomas H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Battle in the Bush* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[5]Joseph Hanlon, "Mozambican Rebels," *The Guardian*, September 29, 1981.

have contributed to a government reassessment of its policies. Inefficiency, spoilage, maladministration and corruption on a wide scale were publicly acknowledged by the highest levels of government by late 1979. Officials noted corruption and nepotism in the operation of the people's stores and the state housing corporation. President Samora Machel himself made a series of unannounced visits to warehouses, factories and dockyards. What he found shocked him. Before a huge crowd in Maputo's Independence Square in March, 1980, he told his listeners:

> We found tonnes of products that were left to rot, left in any old way in the sun, the dampness and the rain and they were spoiled. We found organized red tape, bureaucracy transformed into a system to paralyse our economy.

Machel declared "war on the enemy within."[6]

To implement this new war, Machel reshuffled the Council of Ministers, the government's Cabinet, by relieving Marcelino dos Santos, the Minister of Economic Planning, and Jorge Rebelo, Minister of Information, so that they could devote more attention to strengthening the party and ultimately the economic war effort. To reactivate the economy, Machel has chosen to emphasize discipline in the party. He believes that the party must mobilize the population by obtaining their understanding and their commitment to battle against underdevelopment.

Calling for tighter controls and discipline in national life, the President also required each ministry to streamline its operations and to establish an Office of Control and Discipline. Cases of sabotage and incompetence are to be reported to and dealt with by these offices that are under the supervision of each minister. Those persons caught in corrupt activities have been sent to join criminals and political detainees in one of the country's half dozen reeducation centers. According to official sources, these centers focus on transforming the occupants into honest and hardworking citizens by having them "understand the importance of sociopolitical activity" through education and collective labor.[7] Scepticism abounds on official pronouncements about what really takes place in the centers, although FRELIMO and its Western sympathizers contend that conditions in the camps are humane, unlike the Soviet Union's Siberian counterparts.

Additionally, FRELIMO began to reverse its heavy involvement in people's stores by encouraging private enterprise in small businesses, trading, restaurants and other retail ventures. Machel announced: "The state cannot continue to be involved in hundreds of people's shops. The state cannot manage small businesses."[8] In another departure from earlier policy, the FRELIMO government has become more receptive to Western investment. Currently, the most visible sign of United States investment in Mozambique is the General Tire and Rubber Company.[9] Since independence, most expertise in industry and agriculture has come from the Soviet bloc.

None of these changes suggest a move away from socialism in Mozambique. Instead, the government has decided to concentrate on major development projects. Central planning of the economy remains firmly in place. Under the control of the FRELIMO party, the government will continue to direct development rather than to allow free enterprise to take root outside the small business sector. In fact, the Machel government has given new impetus to expand industrial output. Toward this end, it has backed the managers of factories and checked the power of the workers' production councils, which are composed of ordinary laborers, to increase production.

Foreign organizational models still come largely from the Communist world, which has furnished Mozambique with aid, technicians, and military equipment and advisers since decolonization. Indeed, Mozambique joined COMECON,** the Soviet bloc economic organization, in 1981 to solidify its economic ties with the East. Machel concluded his marathon speech to the Maputo population not with a ringing endorsement of new directions but with a reaffirmation of socialism. "The offensive we have begun is the start of a new war. . . . We will build socialism in the People's Republic of Mozambique."[10]

FOREIGN POLICY

Just as in domestic policy, so also in foreign affairs, Mozambique perceives its international alignment with the Communist states, not with the cap-

(Continued on page 135)

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**COMECON is an acronym for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

[6]Godwin Matatu, "Mozambique: Machel's New War," *Africa,* no. 105, May, 1980, p. 14.

[7]Maputo Home Service, October 10, 1981, printed in *Facts and Reports* (Amsterdam), vol. 11, October 16, 1981, p. 14.

[8]Matatu, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[9]June Kronholz, "Mozambique Woos Foreign Investment But Keeps Socialism," *Wall Street Journal,* December 30, 1980.

[10]Richard Williams, "Mozambique's Presidential Offensive," *Peoples Power,* no. 16, summer, 1980, p. 36.

In Kenya, ". . . the intensifying factionalism—with its potential threat to the unity and stability of the regime—has set the leaders on edge, and they tread a narrow path between repression and license."

Kenya: The Echoing Footsteps

By Patricia Stamp
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At all levels within the government and outside it, in the last three years Kenyans have been engrossed in issues which in the cynical 1980's seem at first glance to be an exercise in political innocence. Defense of the constitution and the rights of individuals before the law, democratic representation, justice for the man and woman in the street—all have taken up thousands of lines of newsprint, hours of parliamentary debate and endless political harangues.

This preoccupation, which is not new but has been greatly heightened in the past three years, can be seen as a consequence first of Kenya's inheritance of a better infrastructure—both economic and administrative—than many other African colonies, and second, of its ability since independence to preserve these advantages, however precariously, adapting them to contemporary exigencies. In other words, Kenya is a genuine young democracy, struggling with the consolidation of its institutions and the development of its political processes.

Kenya's preoccupation can be seen from another perspective, however. Kenya has faced up to its first succession crisis—and many had wondered whether Kenyan democracy could survive the death of Jomo Kenyatta, the "Father of the Nation." The fact that it passed the test peacefully, in contrast to the African pattern of violent succession, should not be taken as an indication that the succession was less than a profound event. Rather, current Kenyan politics should be seen as the ripples extending around the realignment of political forces that had been shaped between the 1950's and Kenyatta's death—a realignment that has seen a change in the political and economic fortunes of many Kenyans.

The year 1981 saw the first challenges to the new people in power, and political events have centered around their attempts to consolidate their positions. In the post-Kenyatta era, the constitution itself has become a weapon of political struggle; and in many respects, this has been beneficial to Kenyans, who can look to the rule of law and the protection of their rights with some assurance. But ominously, the ruling group has found it necessary to take repressive actions in various sectors of the society.

To decipher this contemporary theme in Kenyan politics, the realignment of power must be seen against the background of developing classes. A newly emergent upper class, ensconced in the higher echelons of government, the parastatal corporations and private enterprise, seeks to hold the line against a rambunctious middle class of small farmers, businessmen, local politicians and administrators, civil servants and professionals, the two groups having different views of the course of Kenya's development. If there is inter-class rivalry in Kenya, it is between these two groups—with the latter seeking to ensure the development of small-scale, home-grown capitalist enterprise and the former seeing Kenya's interests in the direction of large-scale enterprise, both public and private, allied with international capital.

Both groups promote their cause in the name of fair play, democracy and the best interests of the *wananchi* (citizens, literally, "children of the soil"—a profoundly evocative term). Much of contemporary Kenyan politics is taken up with this rivalry, with the middle class using Parliament, the press and local government councils vociferously to argue its case. By and large, the lower classes—the peasants, the marginally self-employed, the unemployed and workers in the formal sector—do not participate as a united group in the political process, but identify with the aspirations of the middle classes, allowing them to speak on their behalf.

And so what draws the eye to Kenya today is not the economic crisis that it faces as urgently as any nation in the world, but its political scenario. And how Kenya copes with the crises of recession and inflation very much depends on how political issues are faced and resolved.[1]

In order to understand the direction taken by

[1]Aaron Segal, "Kenya: Africa's Odd Man In," *Current History,* March, 1981. Segal's description of contemporary Kenyan society serves as a background to the discussion that follows here.

the new regime, the circumstances surrounding the succession must be considered. Two years before Kenyatta's death in 1978, his "family" of supporters in powerful government and business positions—many of them members of the Kiambu branch of the Kikuyu like himself (and some his direct relatives)—united in a movement to prevent Vice President Daniel Arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group of west-central Kenya, from standing in the line of succession to the presidency.[2] The "family" felt that one of its members should more properly inherit Kenyatta's mantle (the fact that realpolitik required a non-Kikuyu Vice President had always disturbed the "family"). Indeed, rightly or wrongly, the "family" became associated at home and abroad with the "political and other forms of liquidation" of those likely to stand in the way of a "family" succession.

In 1974, a special "operational team" of police had been set up in the Rift Valley Province as part of the police force's Stock Theft Unit. The team, which was trained and equipped for paramilitary activity, was recruited chiefly from Kiambu Kikuyu. The ostensible purpose of the team was to counter *ngoroko* (literally, cattle rustler) activities. But the 250-man team, independent from both the police force and the regular paramilitary General Service Unit, came to be designated by the name of its quarry, ngorokos, as its members themselves succumbed to the temptations of corruption and thuggery. It is widely believed that those opposed to Moi failed to assassinate him by a hair's breadth, with Moi evading the roadblock set up to catch him in the tense hours after Kenyatta's death because the ngorokos failed to recognize him.[3]

Whether Kenya was that close to a coup remains an open question—and indeed, "the salvation of one's political and economic fortunes dictated a U-turn" among Moi's opponents. "The new bandwagon was moving," and after the opposition's debacle, everyone jumped aboard, pledging loyalty to Moi and electing him unopposed as President of both the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the government. But there was a considerable sense of insecurity among the new ruling group. The physical security of the state and loyalty to the new leaders took on an immediacy they might otherwise not have had. Loyalty and obedience have been the regime's chief preoccupation ever since.

The Moi government moved with considerable flexibility and ingenuity to tackle the tasks that faced it. At the formal level, it sought to deal with the considerable injustices of Kenyatta's last years and to redress some of the regional and economic imbalances. Political detainees, notably the novelist Ngugi wa Thiongo, were released; the emphasis on constitutionality, begun in response to the 1976 challenge, was heightened;[4] the government cracked down on smuggling activities and other forms of corruption; the worst excesses of the Kiambu Kikuyu economic activity were curbed. Ethnic associations, which provided the base not only for ethnic factionalism, but for economic opportunism, were banned. (The ban was aimed principally at the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association [GEMA], which was ostensibly a pan-ethnic organization for the social and economic advance of all Kikuyu-speaking people, but which in fact was a tool in the service of upper class Kiambu Kikuyu interests.)

In tackling these tasks, the regime was careful to shore up its own flanks, and it is not surprising that its activities entrenched the regime's authority and redistributed political and economic opportunities toward non-Kikuyu areas—especially towards Moi's Rift Valley Province.

Above all, the regime sought to establish its legitimacy and weld ethnic alliances through its newly minted ideology of *Nyayoism*. *Nyayo* is the Swahili word for footsteps, and Moi adopted it as a slogan soon after his accession to indicate his promise to follow in Kenyatta's footsteps. On the one hand, the slogan legitimized Moi's regime by testifying to its continuity with the past; on the other hand, it provided a rallying cry for all Kenyans to unite behind the regime. The slogan was soon elevated to the status of an ideology, or philosophy as it is called, with "peace, love and unity" the goals toward which the footsteps were directed. It also became a metaphor for authority, and the theme of constitutionality was linked to it directly: Attorney General Njonjo claimed in 1979 that obedience to the constitution and following nyayo were one and the same.[5]

But as the regime consolidated its power, increasingly it was Moi's footsteps that were described in the regime's exhortations to the people.[6]

The 1979 elections were an orchestration of the

[2]For a full discussion on the succession see, Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, *The Kenyatta Succession* (Nairobi: Transafrica Book Distributors, 1980). This book is an excellent piece of investigative journalism, covering this challenge to Moi's position, and the succession itself, in depth.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 170. The account of the hours before and after Kenyatta's death reads like a thriller.

[4]The propaganda on behalf of the constitution had the interesting side effect of awakening Kenyans to the possibilities of their legal system. Since the succession there has been a wave of litigation for every conceivable kind of dispute, and lawyers are having a field day.

[5]*Nation*, January 27, 1979.

[6]Stephen Katz, "The Succession to Power and the Power of Succession: *Nyayoism* in Kenya," unpublished manuscript, 1981, p. 11.

ideological theme: nyayo Kenyans elected a nyayo Parliament in nyayo elections, and a nyayo Cabinet was formed. "*Nyayoism* was a form of personal commitment to the government and the sanction for government to control the lives of the people."[7] In turn, the government's nyayo measures in the first two years had a populist and broadly libertarian national appeal.[8] The new regime used Kenyatta's posthumous imprimatur to establish itself, but it succeeded in making a peaceful break with the past as well.

But the contradictions inherent in Kenyan society could not long remain muted by this feast of peace, love and unity. The Moi regime had deliberately sought a wide base of support, among non-"family" Kikuyu as well as other ethnic groups (indeed, the two most influential members of Moi's inner circle, Mwai Kibaki and Charles Njonjo, are Kikuyu). In the west, the Luo, Kenya's second largest ethnic group, and in the east, the various Coast Province groups had felt particularly aggrieved by Kiambu domination. But while their grievances had been heeded after Moi's accession (for example, a major coast development project for tourism was removed from the hands of a Kikuyu-backed developer), the underlying problems that caused them to lag behind the country's center in economic development remained. Central Province had received a head start from the special concessions received in the colonial government's attempt to contain Kikuyu nationalism after Mau Mau, as well as from the European settler farming and marketing infrastructure developed there. Its consequent lead in development would be hard for any other region to overtake.

The coupling of these disadvantages with the removal of the Kikuyu stranglehold on national politics released centrifugal forces in Kenya, which Nyayoism was hard pressed to conceal. Moreover, the persistence of the conditions that had engendered corruption and economic opportunism in the first place meant that any attempts to end them would ultimately fail. It is widely believed that the most flagrant instances of "grabbing," both of positions of political influence and of economic opportunity, have simply shifted west, into the hands of the Kalenjin and their closest allies. There have even been allegations that Moi himself has not been immune to the temptations of power, and that he appropriated foreign reserves to buy Nairobi's most prestigious office tower, formerly a property of the Bernie Cornfeld empire. Whether these allegations are true or not, the perception that they are has led to resentment and frustration.[9]

In the context of economic recession, inflation and falling prices for Kenya's commodities,[10] the political and economic contradictions became increasingly sharp, so that by 1981, Nyayoism was being used increasingly repressively to bring new and resurgent sources of opposition under control. In February, university students planned a lecture boycott and demonstration to commemorate the March, 1975, assassination of J.M. Kariuki; Moi found it necessary to respond to this familiar student maneuver by closing the university for three weeks, stating that "I have been good for too long. . . . My love for university students has spoiled them."[11]

When doctors went on strike in May for higher pay, articulating the resentment of the state-employed middle class at the erosion of its buying power, the government responded harshly with arrests and court action—even detaining some doctors' wives. Haunted by the prospect of spreading unrest in the civil service, the government sought to undermine the doctors' position by accusing them of ulterior political motives. When the students demonstrated in the doctors' cause later that month, the government responded with violence, the police engaging students (and some innocent bystanders) in running battles in downtown Nairobi. The university was closed once more, and students were forced to return home, where they were required to report twice weekly to the nearest police or administrative headquarters. While some students had carried banners proclaiming "Victory to the Workers," "Down with neocolonialism" and "We support the workers and peasants,"[12] it would be difficult to classify Kenyan students as a radical threat to the state, despite the government's quick allegation.[13] The translation of these incidents into issues regarding the state's stability and authority,

[7]Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[8]One of the most popular measures was the introduction of a free milk scheme in primary schools—a scheme which in fact had been drawn up by government health planners as part of human resource development policy, probably prior to Moi's accession. Government of Kenya, *Development Plan 1979-1983* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1979), p. 106.

[9]Ayi Kwei Armah, *The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born* (London: Heinemann, 1968).

[10]The price of Kenya's agricultural exports fell in 1979 by 4.9 percent, mainly due to the decline in coffee and tea prices. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *Economic Survey 1980* (Nairobi: Government Printer, June, 1980), p. 85.

[11]*Nation*, March 1, 1981.

[12]*Ibid.*, May 16, 1981.

[13]*Weekly Review* (Kenya), May 29, 1981, p. 17. The government claimed that Marxist lecturers masterminded the student unrest with the aid of foreign funds, and left-wing academics have from that time been the target of government action. A number had their passports confiscated. There was no evidence in 1981, however, that academics or others posed even as much as the tempered left-wing challenge of the Kenya People's Union in the late 1960's.

at a time when the Moi regime was apparently secure, must be seen in the light of other events.

First, the government had a practical reason for suppressing any demonstrations of disaffection or discontent, for in June it was to host the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference, and wanted no "internal disturbances that could mar the image of the country's much talked about political stability."[14] Second, a bizarre treason trial, which occupied the front pages of newspapers for much of the first half of 1981, had provided a cloak and dagger drama with the uncomfortable overtones of the "Ngoroko affair." A Kikuyu businessman, Andrew Muthemba, was charged with attempting to procure arms from the Kenyan army as part of a plot to overthrow the government.

During the investigation, Charles Njonjo's name was linked to the plot. Muthemba claimed in his defense that he had approached an army officer for ammunition as part of his own private detection work to prove corruption in the army. The court found him innocent of treason, if misguided in his patriotic sleuthing (defense counsel provided evidence that he was mentally unstable). The involvement of Njonjo, who is a distant cousin of Muthemba, proved to have been the work of an opponent of senior rank in Kenya's secret service, who had taken the opportunity provided by Muthemba's boasts about the relationship to implicate Njonjo in the plot and thereby to bring him into disrepute.

But before the exposure of the entire affair as a farce, the regime—and the country—lived through several months of apprehension about the security of the state. Credit must go to Kenya's excellent legal system for handling the case meticulously and preventing the incident from getting out of hand, thereby causing a genuine threat to the regime's stability. The regime would certainly have been in trouble if the attack on Njonjo had succeeded. Further, anti-Kikuyu sentiment ran high during the trial, and any other outcome would have threatened the hard-won truce between Kikuyu and other ethnic groups in Kenya. Thus, given the anxiety about the treason case, and concern about the approaching international spotlight, it is not surprising that the government reacted so harshly to the doctors and the students.[15]

Ironically, while the government jousted with imaginary enemies, a process was under way that posed a more genuine risk to the Moi regime. 1981 saw the rise of seemingly inchoate factional infighting, which became more intense as the year wore on. By November, the jockeying for position had degenerated into the rather ludicrous spectacle of name-calling, where any political disagreement became grounds for labeling an opponent anti-nyayo.

Underlying the seemingly disorganized infighting, however, there were outlines of a struggle within the ruling hierarchy, a struggle that indicates that the alignment of political power is not so firmly set as it appeared in the heady nyayo days of 1979. Moi's two great allies, Mwai Kibaki, now Vice President, and Charles Njonjo, now member of Parliament and Minister for Constitutional and Home Affairs, seemed to be squaring off for a showdown after a number of skirmishes during the year. The venue of that showdown was to be the rumored upcoming national elections for the KANU executive. The two previous party elections had provided opportunities to realign political power (the 1966 elections saw the neutralization of the party's left wing and had led to the diminution of Luo leader Oginga Odinga's power. His resignation led to the founding of the ill-fated Kenya People's Union, whose subsequent banning marked the effective end of both left-wing and Luo opposition to the Kenyatta regime).

The events of 1978 had proved that the vice presidency of the nation and of the party were sensitive and influential posts, and one could speculate that the two political giants, Njonjo and Kibaki, were jockeying for favorable positions in the event of a dramatic turn of political events. It seemed that the press was being used in the struggle, with the *Standard* acting as Njonjo's spokesman, while the *Nation* less overtly championed Kibaki.

What Moi felt about all this we cannot know. But he does not have Kenyatta's stature or all-encompassing authority, and both Kibaki and Njonjo held more real political power under Kenyatta than he; and these facts must be weighed in the equation. Certainly, his increasingly strident claims during the year that wananchi should show loyalty and obedience to himself as the embodiment of Nyayoism and of the nation could be seen as a

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[14]*Weekly Review*, May 29, 1981, p. 15.

[15]Interestingly, when bank employees followed the doctors' lead and threatened to strike in mid-May, the government settled quickly. At a time when foreign exchange would be flooding in with the OAU delegates, disruption of banking services would have been disastrous.

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"Mugabe must balance contending factions in Zimbabwe if his government is to survive as an economic and political force in southern Africa."

Report from Zimbabwe

By Virginia Curtin Knight
Associate Editor, Current History

TUESDAY, August 11, 1981, was a national holiday in Zimbabwe in honor of Zimbabwe's hero, Herbert Chitepo. His body had just been returned from Zambia for burial at Heroes Acre outside Salisbury, alongside other heroes of the war for liberation. Chitepo was Zimbabwe's first African lawyer; in 1963, he had become the national chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In 1975, during the guerrilla war to free Rhodesia from the white minority government led by Prime Minister Ian Smith, Chitepo was assassinated in Lusaka, Zambia.

During the week of the national holiday, Africans and whites alike formed long lines at the Meikles Hotel in downtown Salisbury to view the free film of the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana. The Jameson Hotel in Salisbury held a prawn festival in its wood-paneled Tiffany dining room, attended primarily by whites, who listened to a white piano player playing "Yesterday." Across from the luxurious Monomatapa Hotel, within view of a recently integrated swimming club, elderly Europeans, dressed in white as the occasion demanded, enjoyed a game of lawn bowls.

Contradictions abound; the African community and its sense of pride contrast sharply with the white community and its anger. Zimbabwe's multiracial governing elite includes some of the most highly educated Africans in black Africa; many of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's associates earned their doctorates in the United States. But although the Africans are beginning to exercise their newly achieved political power, the dwindling white minority, less than three percent, about 180,000, continues to hold the reins of economic power.

Today, under an agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference in London in 1979, former Prime Minister Ian Smith sits as a member of Parliament across the aisle from ZANU-Patriotic Front leader and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Among the African male members of Parliament there is no vestige of traditional dress; the speaker of Parliament wears a black robe and a white wig; ironically, the many guards at the Parliament building are all white members of the security force.

A landlocked nation of about 7 million people, about 70 percent Shona and 16 percent Ndebele, Zimbabwe is a land of physical beauty, richly endowed with mineral resources and fertile land. It has a well-developed infrastructure, especially in comparison with neighboring Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia). There are well-paved, two-lane roads, railroads, a telecommunications system, clean drinking water and modern hotels in major cities.

Housing conditions vary along the road from Salisbury to Bulawayo (the second largest city, with a population of about 360,000 people). In Gwelo, where the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation (formerly RISCO, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation) operates, some mill workers are beginning to enjoy middle class housing, although 90 percent of the workers live in corrugated metal buildings or barracks. Salaries for steel workers range widely, from the minimum wage of Z$85 a month to Z$800 a month for the more skilled workers (Z$1=US$1.40).

Tom Moyo, a ZANU party member and a security officer at the ZISCO plant, told this writer that he was willing to listen to the government and not ask for a wage increase until the government had time to set an overall national policy.[1] Other workers at the ZISCO plant, members of an unofficial trade union, were less patient.

In the more remote areas of Zimbabwe, however, people are living in traditional kraals, in houses made of mud and thatch. And near Gwelo, off the main road, metal-roofed barrack-like buildings edge the property of a white-owned farm.

In Salisbury, Zimbabwe's modern capital of more than 600,000 people, most Africans live in townships, like Highfields and Harare, on the outskirts of the city. Under white rule, African housing was established in large clusters that were easily controlled. Houses in the townships, with three to four rooms, are made of cinder block and rent for about $15 a month. Each of the townships has its

[1]Comments cited in this article were gathered in interviews during August, 1981, by this writer.

own market area, where basic foods and other necessities are sold. Until independence, Africans had to return to their townships by seven o'clock in the evening.

Today, African government officials and private entrepreneurs are able to afford housing in previously restricted all-white suburban areas. Under white rule, an African was not permitted to own his own business; but since independence a small but growing black middle class of professionals and businessmen has begun to profit from the new society. Middle class Africans benefit in part from an extensive network of contacts based on family ties and shared experiences during the fighting and during their years in exile and the relationships they established during their college and university years in Rhodesia or abroad.

The British made some effort to educate Africans (English is spoken throughout the country except in the more rural areas), and a limited educational, especially primary, system was established. Since independence, however, the number of primary students alone has increased from about 17,000 to 80,000; the increased demand is due in part to the reopening of rural schools that were destroyed or closed down during the long war for independence.

The education department at the University of Zimbabwe is currently undertaking an extensive program called Zim-Sci to teach rural students elementary levels of science. Because there is a shortage of qualified teachers for science programs, the university is preparing science kits and instructors' manuals so that student-teachers can go into rural areas to teach. The teachers' manuals begin with an illustration and explanation of the uses of a pencil.

Great Britain's long colonial rule left its imprint on the minds of blacks and whites as well as on their economic system and political structures. Most white Europeans continue to call themselves Rhodesians; racially arrogant and insensitive, they maintain that Zimbabwe has developed because of their efforts and abilities. They apparently feel that the blacks should be grateful to them. And they are unable to comprehend the deep resentment of the Africans.

This white inability to comprehend was evident in a conversation between Senator Mark Partridge, a white member of Parliament, and several African residents of Salisbury, some of whom worked in the Salisbury hospital. Partridge was expressing impatience with the deteriorating conditions of the hospital because, with the white exodus, it is insufficiently staffed and is especially short of doctors. The Africans maintained that the British had made no effort to train or to make room for African doctors during the era of white rule and that the doctor shortage is a result of white racist and economic attitudes.

Convinced of their superiority, many whites complain that they are not receiving the promotions in government and civil service jobs that they deserve. And yet, most of them continue to refer to the government leaders as terrorists, refusing to use any term that might connote dignity or legitimacy. Whites who seem unable to come to terms with the past will probably never reconcile themselves to the new society.

Initially, the Mugabe government stressed its desire for a multiracial society. Thus, in October, 1981, Mugabe dismissed his outspoken Minister of Health, Herbert Ushewokunze, because his policies and his haste to establish nationwide free and equitable health care facilities were antagonizing white medical personnel and creating shortages of staff.

Mugabe understands that whites are important to Zimbabwe; they have economic and technical expertise that the African community lacks. The white commercial farming sector, for instance, produces more than 70 percent of the nation's food. Whites own more than half the nation's agricultural land and the more than 6,000 white commercial farmers or farming companies earn about 50 percent of the nation's export revenues. Nonetheless, one of Mugabe's most pressing problems is to distribute land to the more than 60 percent of the African population that lives in overcrowded tribal trust lands. But he is pledged to redistribute the land without adversely affecting the white commercial farmers who not only provide foreign exchange earnings that help pay for his social programs but also meet domestic food consumption demands.

In the near future, Mugabe must try to provide services like health care and a national education system, all of which require substantial sums of money. He must maintain an army of about 25,000 former guerrillas, who are supported by the government until they can be resettled or can find jobs in the private sector.

Today, Mugabe has won support for his programs from the international community. In March, 1981, at the Zimbabwe Conference for Reconstruction and Development (Zimcord), more than 31 nations and international lending agencies pledged aid in the amount of Z$917 million. Some of this aid money will help to establish social ser-

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Virginia Curtin Knight traveled to southern Africa during the summer of 1981 under the auspices of the American Forum for International Study.

"Long-term issues of equity and development underlie [Zimbabwe's] current political tensions, which rise out of 90 years of gross racial imbalance in the allocation of resources to rural areas. . . ."

Land Policy and Politics in Zimbabwe

BY JOHN W. HARBESON
Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Parkside

ONE of the most critical questions in Zimbabwe today is whether the nearly two-year-old government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe will be able to redress a century of racially based inequality while simultaneously encouraging the resumption of economic growth. For Zimbabwe, as for Kenya, land policy in the rural areas is the proving ground for the government's ability to promote both growth and equity.

During the first two years of independence, the Mugabe government struggled to establish its political capacity to address these fundamental issues while dealing with immediate and serious political pressures. There have been serious if somewhat submerged strains within the Prime Minister's own party, centering on his policies of racial reconciliation and pragmatism. So far, the Mugabe government has received only limited rewards for its courageous policy of racial reconciliation. Former Rhodesian Prime Minister and currently a member of Parliament Ian Smith has expressed public concern over the course of the economy since independence, and his party, the Rhodesian Front, won an important parliamentary election in 1981 against a new party seeking to win European-held seats for those pledged to cooperation and reconciliation with the Mugabe government. While the government must find short-term answers to these crises, the longer-term success of the government's policies will depend in part on the speed, scope and successful implementation of the highly visible land resettlement program under which Africans from overcrowded zones are to be settled on abandoned and underutilized white farms.

The government has pledged support to the relatively small number of European farmers upon whom the country's agricultural economy depends in the short run. Despite higher product prices and bumper crops, the difficulty of persuading the European community to remain and continue contributing to the country's development is reflected in a continued high European settler emigration rate. Yet failure to succeed in this effort will increase African unemployment to dangerous levels. With a population growth rate well over 3.0 percent a year, nearly 50,000 new jobs must be created annually. Increases in unemployment of these proportions would undermine the government's political standing and its capacity to implement carefully conceived and executed rural development programs that will promote growth and employment.

The government has been beset by well-publicized dissension between Mugabe's own party, Zimbawe African National Union (ZANU), and its minority partner in the government, the Patriotic Front, formerly Zimbawe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo. While Mugabe has enough parliamentary support to govern alone, his support is almost entirely among the Shona, who comprise more than 70 percent of Zimbabwe's African population. Moreover, Mugabe's and Nkomo's parties jointly conducted the liberation war. The legitimacy of the government as the leader of post-liberation Zimbabwe and as a government of all the people clearly depends upon maintaining the coalition. The successful integration of each party's liberation armies into a unified Zimbabwean army is a key to political stability. The search for stability underlies the recent flirtation with the establishment of a one-party system, attractive to Mugabe on ideological grounds but difficult as long as the government coalition remains shaky. In the long term, however, successful coalition government may depend on the equitable allocation of the means of production between the communities supporting each party. Initially, the Shona gained most from resettlement because population pressures in rural areas were greatest among the Shona. But the settlement program must take into account not only these immediate pressures but the demands of the Ndebele, who make up about 16 percent of the population and want the resettlement program expanded to include more Africans from other areas of the country.

Long-term issues of equity and development underlie the country's current political tensions, which rise out of 90 years of gross racial imbalance in the allocation of resources to rural areas and a

striking history of failure of settler governments to promote some progress in the African-held rural areas.

Zimbabwe inherited several models for promoting rural development through land use improvement and/or redistribution, all of which carried unfavorable connotations. Under the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, tens of thousands of Africans were forcibly transferred from European farming areas to enlarged reserves. During the liberation war, more than half a million Africans were resettled in protected villages in order to isolate them from the guerrillas. Following the war and pending their integration into the regular army or some other form of employment, the guerrillas were settled in "assembly points." It is important for the Mugabe government to demonstrate to Africans being resettled on underutilized former European holdings that they are not just being shuttled about or relegated to areas the Europeans did not consider worth developing.

As the new government initiates land use improvement programs other than resettlement it will also need to be mindful of a history of state imposition of rural development policies on peasant farming areas. In seeking to reduce population pressure on marginal lands through enlarged holdings for some farmers and off-farm employment for others, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 antagonized Africans by seeming to attack their traditional land tenure practices without offering sufficiently attractive alternative economic opportunities for those displaced. In recent years, the Tribal Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) has used statutory authority resembling eminent domain to promote rural development in the traditional peasant farming areas through creation of growth points, small-scale irrigation schemes and improved cash crop farming programs. Opinions vary greatly concerning whether the economic benefits of TILCOR's activities have justified the strong assertion of central government authority over the management of the peasant economy at the grass roots. Nevertheless, the new government continues to maintain the statutory authority established by its immediate predecessor administrations to impose central direction on the peasant farming sector.

Because resettlement and land improvement policies proved unpopular and/or unsuccessful, previous administrations were unable to shape effectively changes in work processes in the African farming areas. Population pressures on lands of marginal productivity had not been reduced and suitable areas for collective livestock grazing had been greatly diminished. Land tenure practices resulted in greater inequalities and, perhaps, increased negotiability of land entitlements. As the 1981 Riddell Commission report noted, rural families had been transformed by the practice of males seeking long-term employment in urban areas while their spouses managed plots in the peasant farming areas. Moreover, the entire institution of chieftainship, to which land allocation and management in the peasant areas had been entrusted, had been undermined by cooperation with and cooptation by previous white settler regimes. The questions of how much authority newly reconstructed local councils will have vis-à-vis the central government in rural land management and how much authority the chiefs will relinquish are not yet resolved. Since independence, local party officials have stepped into the breach. Rural development policies and structures for defining and implementing them that will be acceptable to the rural peasantry must be established promptly.

Decades of government subsidies, research and infrastructural development in support of white farming yielded only modest results. The Riddell Commission claimed that only 5 percent of the farms in the European areas accounted for 48 percent of the marketed production.[1] Similarly 50 percent of the 1974 taxable income was produced by 5 percent of those farm families filing returns. Five percent of the farms also accounted for 50 percent of the land in the commercial areas. Even in the European farming zones, therefore, the government was historically unsuccessful in stimulating or requiring the productive management of small farms. To a significant extent, it is these small farms in the former European areas that the government now seeks to make productive through the present resettlement program.

The new government initiated the resettlement of Africans from overcrowded peasant farming areas on underutilized or abandoned European farms before its development policies and strategies were formulated. Thus using legislative authority inherited from the transitional regime, the Mugabe government began resettlement almost immediately after independence, and several thousand families were resettled during the first year. In mid-1981, the government issued its long-awaited development policy statement, *Growth with Equity*, followed by the publication of the Riddell Commission's findings and recommendations on prices and incomes policies.

The underlying premises of the intensive resettlement scheme are: one, that abandoned or underutilized farms may be resettled in order to increase the overall productivity of the commercial

[1]R. Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1978).

farming zone without disturbing profitable, predominantly European large-scale farming; two, that settlement-land planning should be ecologically sound; three, that target family incomes should be approximately those of agricultural laborers earning the minimum wage; four, that settlers should hold land as a privilege, conditional upon beneficial occupation; five, that cooperative activity should be encouraged; six, that beneficiaries of the program should be those who are landless and unemployed; seven, that settlements should not be expansions of adjacent peasant farming areas in terms of land-use practices; and eight, that European farms should be purchased on a willing buyer–willing seller basis.

The government has currently identified 1.1 million hectares for the resettlement of 18,000 families. Target incomes have been set at $400 per family, an amount reduced from an earlier figure of $1000 plus subsistence by pressure from Britain's Overseas Development Authority. Potential settlers are to be landless and unemployed, with first preference given to war refugees. Wage laborers in the settlement areas previously employed by European farmers are included. Those selected must relinquish whatever entitlements to land they may hold in the peasant farming zones, and preference must be given to those who traditional authorities certify to have little or no land.

Criteria for land selection include: land adjacent to traditional peasant farming areas where population pressures are heaviest; areas not presently actively farmed but which have agricultural potential; areas large enough to permit economical provision of essential services and infrastructure; lands reasonably well served by roads and infrastructure; and areas where information for planning is available so that implementation can take place rapidly. The lands are to be purchased on a willing buyer–willing seller basis at prices ranging from $13 to $45 per hectare, prices that are roughly in accord with 1976 levels. Approximately 85 percent of the lands to be purchased and 70 percent of the settlers to be accommodated are located in areas of regional to marginal potential. Lands are purchased with grant funds provided by the United Kingdom. By sharp contrast to the Kenya programs, the Zimbabwe settlers are not required to pay for the land. As in Kenya, the government is encouraging productive commercial farmers to remain, because their output is critical to the economy, at least in the short term. The Lancaster House Constitution in effect guaranteed continued occupation of the land by productive commercial farmers and "adequate" (which may be different from "fair") compensation for those whose lands are purchased.

Settlers' tenure is to be established on the basis of permits to reside, cultivate and graze livestock. These permits afford the settlers neither freehold tenure nor leasehold but simply temporary permission to occupy and use a portion of land at the pleasure of the government. These permits provide the settlers no recourse against government actions that might be taken in the interests of effective land management. Though lacking security, the holder is required to pay all necessary taxes, destock on command and adhere to recommended agricultural practices. Settlers may be required to live in villages and to accept any placement of infrastructure decided upon by the government. Settlers have not, in fact, been required to prove that they have relinquished all rights in the traditional peasant farming areas, but they are required to discard a degree of security they might enjoy in these areas for the possibility of improved standards of living under the government's supervision.

The government has begun the development of the schemes by ploughing an initial half hectare per family to facilitate planting promptly after the settlers arrive. In the future the settlers will be responsible for all cultivation activities. The schemes have been planned on the assumption that the settlers will have sufficient oxen as a group to obviate reliance upon tractor ploughing, an assumption that has proved somewhat unrealistic during 1981. The Ministry of Land Settlement and Rural Development (MLSRD) will either repair existing boreholes, roads and dip tanks or, if they are not available, will construct them. There is to be one clinic for every 300 to 500 settlers and one classroom for each 45 children on the schemes. Settlers are to be guided in their work by extension agents on the basis of one extension assistant for every 200 families, an animal health specialist for each 500 families, and a cooperative development officer and a resettlement officer for each 600 families. The government is to construct residences for these officials.

In addition to their cultivation and livestock management tasks, the primary responsibility of the settlers is the formation of cooperative societies, the establishment of elected settler committees to advise the schemes' administrative staff, and the collective construction of schools and other infrastructural improvements. The Mugabe government has stated its preference for more cooperative forms of social organization in rural areas but has indicated that it will not force such organization on the people before they indicate support for the idea. The settlers as a group appear to harbor substantial reservations about both cooperatives and villages. Cooperation in harvesting and build-

ing projects is traditional, but the capabilities of marketing cooperatives to keep separate records of each farmer's produce is not known. Against the Ministry of Health's argument that clinics can serve more people more economically if they are grouped in villages, the settlers' rejoinder is that villages will promote the spread of the very diseases the clinics are supposed to deal with.

Progress in the resettlement effort has been steady, but it has lagged behind official and grassroots expectations. By February, 1981, the government had identified 387,000 hectares of European land for sale and had resettled more than 1,400 families. There was no shortage of European land for sale at the modest prices. Squatting on potential settlement lands in advance of formal acquisition and demarcation was a relatively limited and isolated occurrence. Indeed, potential settlers themselves entertained strong reservations concerning the settlement program, including fears of the conversion of plots into collective farms, loss of contact with families in the traditional peasant farming areas, being settled on lands that even the Europeans did not think were worth developing, isolation from schools and clinics, inadequate food supplies if late crops did not prosper, excessive government management, and lack of tenure security.

By late 1981, the MLSRD had settled nearly 4,500 families but there were increasing criticisms that the pace and extent of the program were inadequate. The Riddell Commission stated that settlement of at least 33,000 families would be required, nearly twice the original planning figure. European commercial farmers complained vocally of the threats to the viability of their operations posed by squatters. The problem does appear to have escalated, although complaints about the squatter problem may have been exaggerated to some extent because squatters symbolized a deeper fear of the farming community about their own security of tenure.

Logistical problems have undermined some of the planning assumptions. Tractors and oxen were not available in adequate numbers; heavy rains also delayed the process of settlement and the launching of farming operations. Trained extension staff were in short supply. Staff shortages also hindered the development of better baseline information about traditional peasant farming economics, critical for the development of effective policies for these long-ignored regions.

TOWARD A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The government's evolving strategy for land reform and rural development must satisfy a number of criteria. It must provide guidance for the development of new policies and/or the reshaping of existing policies. But it must also reflect the government's ideological predilections, promote the rehabilitation of a war-ravaged economy and complement strategies for the promotion of the urban, industrial and mining sectors.

The government's economic policy statement, *Growth with Equity,* issued in the spring of 1981, proclaimed the administration's intention to promote socialism, democracy, economic growth, employment, a range of programs and services to achieve full human resource development, natural resource conservation and international as well as regional economic cooperation. The Riddell Commission issued two recommendations that bear on the role of land resettlement. First, it called for a substantial increase in the size of the program to help accommodate the country's employment requirements. Second, it advocated a wage and price structure so that families could be fully supported either from rural or from urban employment but would not need to have one breadwinner in each sector to make ends meet. The commission recommended increases in minimum wage levels to which the settlers' incomes were to be tied. These first and very important reports have a great bearing on the role of antecedent resettlement programs in the country's evolving rural development strategy. Several points are of considerable significance.

First, the government has decided to concentrate heavily on the redress of long-standing inequalities without heavy reliance on nationalization. In addition, the Prime Minister has indicated that nationalization is not to be a major organization strategy for realizing socialism; he views the ownership of the means of production in traditional terms: collective ownership of land but individual use of these resources and proprietorship over the products of one's labor. As in the case of the creation of a single party, the government appears to be prepared to wait until there is strong and demonstrable public support for more collective economic activity.

The government has, however, retained the option of acting in what it considers to be the national

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"The transition from war to peace in southern Africa and from expansion to recession in the global economy poses almost insurmountable problems for the Zambian leadership. Its preoccupation with the liberation of Zimbabwe has ended, but national development remains as elusive as ever. . . ."

The Political Economy of Zambia

By Timothy M. Shaw
Associate Professor of Political Science, Dalhousie University

THE world is considerably more perplexing for Zambia in the 1980's than it was at any time since Zambia became independent in 1964. Paradoxically, the independence of neighboring Zimbabwe, along with the low price of copper and a high price for oil, intensified the problems confronting the Zambian state.[1] Until the present decade, the leadership's priority was the liberation of southern Africa, a goal that disguised its basic difficulty—its dependence on copper extraction and exportation.

The embattled and isolated character of President Kenneth Kaunda's administration was exposed with the victorious conclusion of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and with the various contradictions of the ideology of humanism in Zambia. The one-party state has increasingly revealed itself as a one-man regime, with the President responding almost unilaterally to a series of challenges and constraints. When peace in Zimbabwe failed to bring prosperity at home, the continuing combination of economic decline and political decay generated widespread disillusion and opposition, exacerbated by the failure of the critical maize crop in 1980. Real gross domestic product fell by almost 50 percent in the second half of the 1970's, while crucial government capital expenditures declined by over 60 percent.

In response to rising criticism, inflation and unemployment, Kaunda moved to suppress domestic opposition and to solicit external support. The central features of his interrelated responses were trade union regulation and International Monetary Fund (IMF) finance. Fortuitously, the 1981 maize harvest was a record 7 million bags, and the high price of petroleum products moderated somewhat; along with renewed access to foreign exchange and inputs, these circumstances provided a breathing space for the regime. Nevertheless, the price of food continues to rise as subsidies are reduced. And the global economic condition—and hence the demand and price for copper—is unlikely to improve significantly.

Zambia's drift or decline is likely to continue as the regional struggle moves ineluctably southward and the global recession reduces national income and foreign exchange. In turn, these changes will intensify internal demands for reform in the political economy, demands that will be difficult if not impossible to meet, given the scarcity of political and economic resources. The President has balanced ethnic, regional and factional interests since 1964, a task made easier by regular appeals for national unity in the face of incursions by the Rhodesian army in pursuit of anti-government guerrillas. However, over the last two years, the balancing act has become more difficult. At the same time, Kaunda's image has lost some of its luster. Its commitment to regional liberation not only cost Zambia political and economic resources; the conclusion of the war in Rhodesia also exposed its continued vulnerability to global market forces.

Thus the installation of an African government in Salisbury may mark the beginning and not the end of Zambia's structural crisis so long contained by the priority of Zimbabwe. Regional imperatives no longer constrain domestic demands; yet global conditions remain unpromising for national development. The removal of the regional preoccupation reveals that Zambia's unhappy place in the world system of the 1980's is not so different from its place before UDI* in 1965.[2]

Over the last two decades, Zambia was in the vanguard of support and facilities for regional liberation movements, especially those in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. But its role as a front-

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*See the article in this issue by John Harbeson, "Land Policy and Politics in Zimbabwe."

[1]For an overview of these problems see Timothy M. Shaw and Douglas G. Anglin, "Zambia and the Crises of Liberation," in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 199–222. For a succint introduction to national history and society see Irving Kaplan, ed., *Zambia: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979).

[2]Michael Holman, "Zambia," in *Africa Guide, 1981* (Saffron Walden: World of Information, 1980), p. 395.

line state was transformed in the six years after the 1974 Portuguese coup. The traumas of interventions from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) into Zambian territory, intrusions of guerrillas into Zambian affairs, and negotiations over transitional arrangements in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe imposed strains on Zambian society. Except for the protracted process of change in Namibia, which still involves South African raids into western Zambia and southern Angola, Zambia now shares borders with black, not white-ruled, states. Yet the new regional environment raises new challenges for the beleaguered regime.

First, despite the elusiveness of integration and development in Africa, regionalism remains a popular strategy. Now reformulated under the guise of "collective self-reliance," regional integration could advance growth among the region's black states and simultaneously reduce their dependence on white-ruled South Africa. The six front-line states are the core of the nine members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which is attempting to advance regional communications and other projects without South African participation. As a landlocked country, Zambia stands to gain from improved regional rail, road and other infrastructures. In addition to multilateral cooperation (and despite Kaunda's close relationship with Joshua Nkomo),[3] Zambia has improved its bilateral links with Zimbabwe. When visiting Lusaka in January, 1981, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe signed joint agreements with Zambia. He also examined Zambia's one-party system as a possible model for Zimbabwe and asked Kaunda to use his influence with Nkomo to reduce the latter's estrangement from the new Salisbury regime. And to symbolize the new relationship, President Kaunda paid an emotional state visit to Zimbabwe in July, 1981.

Second, with the end of Idi Amin's brutal regime in Uganda, the "Mulungushi Club" of Presidents Kaunda, Milton Obote of Uganda, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya has been revived, reopening the prospect of Zambian association with a successor to the East African Community organization. This multilateral association also moderates bilateral tension, especially with Tanzania. The Chinese-built Tazara railroad running from the Copperbelt in Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, continues to have problems: the Chinese locomotives are neither powerful nor reliable; and Zambia's foreign exchange difficulties have delayed its debt payments at the port. Indeed, Zambia applied some of its 1981 IMF loan to pay off its port debts in order to improve the flow of its copper exports and thus to increase its foreign exchange earnings to pay for vital imports.

Third, notwithstanding the enhanced possibilities of regional cooperation in southern and eastern Africa, tensions remain. Border conflicts and refugee problems continue, the former mainly with Malawi, Namibia and Zaire, the latter with Angola, Malawi and Namibia. And Zambia has invested scarce foreign currency in a $100-million arms purchase from the Soviet Union designed to transform its air force into one of the best in the region, complemented by Soviet technicians and equipped with MiG-21 fighters, in addition to Chinese-supplied MiG-19's.

Fourth, Zambia is no longer the regional center that it was from 1964 to 1980.[4] During its first decade of independence, Lusaka was the site of endless conferences, negotiations and declarations, mainly on southern Africa; for instance, it hosted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1970 and the Commonwealth Conference in 1979. Since 1980, Salisbury has become the center for diplomacy, industry and communications in southern Africa, sidelining Zambia and its illustrious President. But as a form of compensation for the fact that SADCC headquarters are located in Gaborone, Botswana, Lusaka is the center for the large-scale but rather loose eastern and southern African free trade area established at the end of 1981.

RECESSION, REFORM AND REVOLUTION

The diplomatic and psychological problems created for Zambia by Zimbabwe's independence struck a political economy that was already in grave difficulty because of the global recession. The high price of oil and the low price of copper had combined to throw a series of positive balance of payments into deficit; since 1975, Zambia has had a positive balance of payments only in 1979, when the value of copper and cobalt rose momentarily. Between 1974 and 1978, Zambia's terms of trade deteriorated by 52 percent. From a peak in 1974, copper prices fell by 40 percent in 1975, while import prices rose by an average 16 percent a year.[5] The post-Bretton Woods world recession starting in 1974 devastated Zambia's extroverted high-cost

[3]As leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU, now Patriotic Front [PF]), Nkomo was resident in Lusaka for many years. During the struggle he existed in an uneasy state of both cooperation and conflict with Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, now ZANU-PF).

[4]See Anglin and Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).

[5]World Bank, *World Development Report, 1981* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 78.

economy; the reduced demand for and price of copper prevented the importation of essential industrial raw materials. Industrial production peaked in the mid-1970's and, with scarce foreign exchange spent on oil imports, it has never recovered.[6] National and personal incomes fell dramatically; the physical quality of life deteriorated; and diseases like cholera and scabies reappeared. Relative and absolute deprivation provoked political discontent.

Zambia's President and his one-party polity controlled the impact of declining income and consumption until Zimbabwe achieved independence. Then, frustration caused by relentless inflation and unacceptable regime responses produced coup attempts, trade union strikes, and presidential paranoia. The government overreacted in increasingly repressive ways to the atmosphere of crisis.

Although there were frequent rumors of coups, two attempts to overthrow Kaunda were actually made in October, 1980, and June, 1981. In October, 1980, according to the subsequent trial of 13 suspects in August, 1981, military, political and industrial leaders were involved in a plot to divert the President's plane and force him to resign. In June, 1981, a similar group plotted to assassinate the President and his security force officers, to release 13 conspirators after the 1980 plot, and to seize major installations. Both plots were alleged to involve foreign interests and individuals.

In addition to rumors of coups, labor unrest was spreading, particularly in the Copperbelt. Large-scale strikes occurred in January and July, 1981; in January, the strikes occurred because the union leadership was expelled from the ruling United National Independence party (UNIP) and in July, the strikers were protesting racially differentiated incomes. Although both strikes involved violence, the January strike was more serious, raising fundamental issues about the character of the Zambian state.

The expulsion of 17 leaders of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) and the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) from UNIP because of a union-party dispute over an earlier strike was actually part of a struggle over party supremacy and union subordination. The 50,000 strikers were also resisting proposed local government legislation that would decentralize administration and would undermine the union's role in the townships. And the dispute pitted a jealous President against union leader Frederick Chiluba, the possible successor to the late Simon Kapwepwe as the focus of opposition. The mineworkers remain central to Zambia's political economy, and their alienation threatens both economic recovery and political stability. Their union is the only major institution outside UNIP control, and they continue to resist regime tendencies towards aggrandizement and authoritarianism as manifested in the proposed local government system. The party and the union have been on a collision course since the economic crisis intensified in 1980. A proposed general strike was called off because of presidential threats to implicate its leaders in the coup attempt. Yet the union remained concerned about the power of the President and his party. However, after the July strike the party and President hit back: ZCTU chairman Chiluba and three other leaders were detained.

But these and other union officials may be captives rather than organizers: worker discontent with declining living standards is growing so fast that official union structures cannot contain it. Increasing shortages of and prices for food, education, communications and health care have led to widespread political alienation and withdrawal if not to resistance. Hence the regime's growing alarm and its uncharacteristic resort to strong-arm tactics to eliminate perceived opposition.

THE POVERTY OF THE PERIPHERY

To overcome structural constraints and political challenges, the regime has simultaneously blamed and cajoled foreign interests. It has protested external dependence while seeking further loans, and it has claimed external intervention while seeking further arms.

Zambia's dependence on copper is the root cause of its current dilemma. As two recent World Bank reports indicate, Zambia could do relatively little about its role in the world system, especially during the liberation period.

> Since the world copper price peaked in 1974 (never again reaching as much as 60 percent of its peak level in real terms), Zambia has fallen into a prolonged slump characterized by falling real output, inflation, declining foreign exchange reserves, and a large amount of arrears in payment for imports.[7]

> With different policies, Zambia would have been able to slow the decline in incomes after 1974 . . . even with . . . optimistic assumptions, two-thirds of the fall was unavoidable given Zambia's structural dependence on copper.[8]

To secure foreign exchange, to reduce the external payment's "pipeline," and to import raw materials for manufacturers, Zambia negotiated a

[6]On this decline in industrial output because of reduced raw material imports, see World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1981), p. 29.

[7]*Ibid.*

[8]*World Development Report, 1981*, p. 79.

three-year, $1-billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) loan from the IMF in May, 1981, the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, the equivalent of $165 per person. This followed a smaller $300-million SDR loan from 1978 to 1980. The recent loan is being used to pay off port charges and import bills in order to ease copper exports and to increase manufactures production. A $150-million Eurodollar loan in March, 1981, was used to purchase oil.

The terms of the IMF loans pose serious problems for Zambia. Because of the structure of its political economy, particularly its dependence on copper, its continued urbanization, political bargaining and rural decay, the conditions set by the Fund cannot readily be met. The reduction of food (especially maize) subsidies, revitalization of the stagnant parastatal sector, control of domestic credit and incomes, repayment of foreign bills and expansion of agricultural production have all been on the national agenda before. The latest five year economic plan, designed to cover the period "of transition from capitalism to socialism" to 1983, is not likely to realize the $5-billion investment anticipated; and the 10-year agricultural plan to 1990, with its nine 50,000 acre state farms, one in each province, is not likely to terminate the annual $250-million bill for maize imports. Zambia continues to spend scarce resources on its physical infrastructure of roads and railways; and it is investing in new coal mines, fertilizer factories and other crucial manufacturing plants. Yet despite a good maize crop in 1981 and increases in the size of the beef herd, population, urbanization and inflation always run ahead of agricultural production.

Meanwhile, the President claims that foreign subversion is behind domestic opposition. In June, 1981, two senior United States diplomats were expelled and four others were barred from reentry; and in July, Webster Lumbwe of Zambia's foreign office was charged with spying for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). "Last year an unholy alliance of South African money, Zairean mercenaires and Zambian dissidents was supposed to be trying to bring [Kaunda] down"; this year it is the trade unions, soldiers and the CIA.[9]

REPRESSION OR RADICALIZATION?

In addition to expulsion, exclusion and detention, the President has responded to the latest stage in the national crisis in three familiar but ineffectual ways: reshuffling senior ministers, restructuring the parastatal sector and attacking "anti-party" forces in the national bourgeoisie. In February, 1981, Humphrey Mutemba was appointed Secretary-General of UNIP and Nalumino Mundia was appointed Prime Minister, replacing Mainza Chona and Daniel Lisulo, respectively. At the swearing-in ceremony for these two appointees, for the first time the President acknowledged public discontent, but he warned people not to "rock the boat. If the boat capsizes everyone will suffer, and chaos will follow."[10]

As for restructuring the major parastatals, in May, 1981, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines was formed out of Nchanga and Roan Consolidated Copper Mines, the two already massive, partially foreign owned and managed copper companies. This move created the fifth largest copper producer and the second largest cobalt producer in the world. Although details have to be worked out with foreign interests, the consolidation will advance IMF-guided rationalization of an industry that the World Bank characterizes as "at a mature and fully developed phase [which] cannot be expanded and, therefore, cannot maintain its share of the world market."[11] The reprocessing of copper tailings will extend production, but Zambia is still fast approaching the exhaustion of its major nonrenewable resource.

In addition, the long-growing struggle between UNIP with its advocacy of "socialism," on the one hand, and Zambian entrepreneurs with their preference for "capitalism," on the other, broke out into the open in mid-1980. The indirect and in camera debate between more "national" and more "transnational" elements in the Zambian ruling class had intensified as the war in Rhodesia, long blamed for national problems and government procrastination, came to an end. Thereafter interrelated disagreements over the one-party state, development strategy and foreign policy (especially toward southern Africa and Western corporations) became more overt. Presidential declarations and

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[9]*Africa Research Bulletin* (political, social and cultural series), vol. 18, no. 6 (July 15, 1981), p. 6089.
[10]*Ibid.*, vol. 18, no. 2 (March, 15, 1981), p. 5962.
[11]*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 20.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1981-1982. (London: Europa Publications, 11th edition, 1981. 1,383 pages, maps, country-by-country and regional surveys, selected bibliography, who's who, $105.)

This is an indispensable reference work for anyone concerned with African affairs. Section one includes the history of the continent by geographers, historians and economists. Section two presents detailed information on regional organizations.

Section three contains an alphabetical list of all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Each country is evaluated by several specialists and includes lists of members of the current government, statistical surveys, and lists of organizations and institutions.

Virginia Curtin Knight

THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE. *By David Martin and Phyllis Johnson.* (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981. 378 pages, notes and index, $25.00.)

Martin and Johnson present in extensive detail the alliances and maneuverings that permitted the Africans to gain control of their government in the period between 1972 and 1980.

Martin and Johnson focus on the period of guerrilla war between 1972 and independence in 1980 and provide an enormous amount of detail about the membership of ZANU, which eventually won an overwhelming majority in the elections, and ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, which according to the authors was responsible for more than 80 percent of the fighting. V.C.K.

CULTURAL ATLAS OF AFRICA. *Edited by Jocelyn Murray.* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1981. 240 pages, illustrations, bibliography, gazetteer and index, $29.95.)

This book is divided into three sections, the first of which includes text and maps on the geography and topography of Africa. Section two contains text and photographs on African social themes.

The third section is a brief nation-by-nation account of the history and current conditions of each African country; each account includes a mineral resource and agricultural production map and statistical material. V.C.K.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR AFRICA. *Edited by Timothy M. Shaw.* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 365 pages, tables, appendices, index, $30.00, cloth; $14.00, paper.)

Timothy Shaw has assembled 10 articles that discuss Africa's economic needs and prospects for regional and global cooperation. V.C.K.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE PROSPECTS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE. *By Theodor Hanf, Heribert Weiland and Gerda Vierdag.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 492 pages, appendices, selected bibliography, index, $35.00.)

Originally published in German and recently translated into English, this book presents the views of black and white South Africans, radicals, liberals and conservatives, on the possibility of a peaceful transition to majority rule. V.C.K.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CIVILIZATIONS IN TURMOIL. *By Richard W. Hull.* (New York: New York University Press, 1981. 168 pages, selected bibliography and index, $17.50, cloth; $9.00, paper.)

In order to help students understand contemporary racial and ethnic conflict, Richard Hull discusses the history of the entire region of southern Africa. V.C.K.

SOUTH AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT. *Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 517 pages, maps, tables, bibliography and index, $8.95.)

In 1979, the Rockefeller Foundation funded an 11-member panel, headed by president of the Ford Foundation Franklin A. Thomas, to analyze United States policy toward southern Africa. Parts I and II of its report consist of background material on the apartheid system in South Africa, on South Africa's relations with other African countries and on its importance in the global economy. Part III discusses U.S. policy toward South Africa. V.C.K.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND SOUTH AFRICA. *Edited by Alfred O. Hero and John Barratt.* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. 229 pages, index, $21.95)

This collection of 12 essays examines the evolution of American attitudes toward South Africa.

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University of Pennsylvania ■

KENYA

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defensive response to the independent maneuverings of his powerful lieutenants. And in November, he withdrew from his preoccupation with the OAU chairmanship to focus on the problem. He announced that no KANU elections were to be held until his tenure as chairman ended in June, 1982, and that henceforth the name of nyayo should no longer be taken in vain; anti-nyayo name-calling was to cease.

It was unlikely that the banning of "the 'nyayo' weapon" would stop the political battle, however, and although factionalism has always existed in Kenyan politics, it is clear that it has taken on a certain sharp edge in the vacuum left by Kenyatta's death. Having secured a peaceful transition, the major political actors now seem to be stretching their political wings. Thus, under the vibrant debate in the press and in Kenya's democratic institutions, there is an edge of unease and the feeling that Kenyans could all too easily lose what they have so painstakingly gained—in both political and economic well-being.

And for Moi personally, whose immediate support group constitutes an alliance of disparate forces within Kenyan politics, the factionalism reaching into the heart of the alliance demands constant vigilance, with Nyayoism its increasingly dogmatic watchword.

MIDDLE CLASS POLITICS

It was stated earlier that Kenya's middle class is an articulate and informed participant in the nation's political life, constantly voicing its views as to how the nation's affairs should be conducted. Such middle class activism can be seen as the mainstay of Kenya's democratic processes, holding the government accountable to the needs and rights of the wananchi. It also constantly draws attention to the excesses of the elite and voices concern about large-scale foreign investment in, and in control of, Kenyan enterprise, which it perceives as detrimental to homegrown capitalism.[16]

On the other hand, the middle class depends on the government to gain access to the "Kenyan Dream"—to own a small farm, a one-bus transport company, a small rental property or a general store. Few can find the means to make a start on their own, so the state itself has become a major entry point to the middle class. Civil servants, through savings from their steady income or through credit based on their secure jobs, may accumulate enough capital for a small enterprise. Politicians, through their access to the legislative machinery that allocates resources and provides services, may direct such resources their way or exercise patronage in the provision of services. Local government is a particularly fertile field for such activity, because it is the level of government directly involved with the allocation of resources and the provision of services (urban land for business or housing development has been the chief prize for local councillors).[17] Hence, competition to gain entry to local government and to remain there is fierce.

This process is obviously not unfamiliar, nor is it complex. However, it has ramifications for the relationship between the central government and local government. Since independence, the central government has progressively restricted local government's autonomy in the name of efficiency and the curbing of corruption. Indeed, the turbulence of local competition has frequently rendered local authorities chaotic and financially disorganized. But local officials have felt, with some justification, that the central government's actions were not always in the cause of "good government," and that the central government had other motives for depriving local governments of funds. High government circles in the 1970's were preoccupied with the low return on public investment represented by local government expenditures, in comparison with large parastatal enterprises. Competition for scarce state resources could thus be seen as a primary ingredient in the constant tension between central and local government.[18]

Under Kenyatta, this tension was kept under control, and the fractious local authorities more than once found the Old Man's authority invoked

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[16] A survey of large-scale manufacturers and tourist firms, conducted in 1976, revealed that while wholly Kenyan-owned firms represented 60 percent of the total, they accounted for only 37 percent of total issued capital; and while the percentage of foreign-owned capital declined between 1966 and 1976, foreign *control* of enterprise remained high in 1976, at 52 percent. And if one looks at the statistics for high technology enterprise, such as chemicals and textiles, foreign ownership and control are even higher. (Rafel Kaplinsky, "Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery—the Kenyan Case Re-examined," *Review of African Political Economy,* vol. 17, January-April, 1980, pp. 83-105). This issue of the *Review* contains a debate which summarizes the differing views regarding the degree of dependency of Kenya's capitalists on international economic interests.

[17] For a discussion of this, see Patricia Stamp, "Political Implications of Low Cost Housing in Kenya," in Dalton Kehve et al., eds., *Public Land Ownership: Frameworks for Evaluation* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1976).

[18] Local government politics and the relationship between central and local government are the subjects of my dissertation: "Governing Thika: Dilemmas of Municipal Politics in Kenya," London University, 1980.

NAMIBIA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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emerging "tilt" toward Pretoria. The United States veto on August 31 of the Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's raid into southern Angola (the British abstained) provided evidence of what the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had earlier called an "unholy alliance" between Washington and Pretoria.

Still, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, insists that this veto must be viewed in the context of a new United States policy of "evenhandedness." If this is evenhandedness, the black states are not convinced. The administrations of both Presidents Reagan and Jimmy Carter recognize that South Africa holds the key to a Namibian settlement. The Carter people sought to influence Pretoria by applying pressure where they felt South Africa was vulnerable (never enough to please all African states). President Reagan, instead, would prefer to induce South Africa to cooperate by holding out the promise of reward rather than penalty, presumably preferring behind-the-scenes pressure to public moralizing.

Unfortunately for President Reagan's policy in black Africa, there is little to show for the putative quiet diplomacy. But to attempt to remain neutral in this contest (assuming balance is in fact being sought) is, in the eyes of some of the contestants, immoral. In fact, more positive United States attitude toward South Africa yields a more negative attitude toward the United States elsewhere in the world. United States "evenhanded" policy may seem reasonable enough in Washington, but that only testifies to Washington's rarified and isolated atmosphere. From every other angle, United States policy has a pro-South Africa orientation reflecting Washington's insistence that southern African policy must be integrated into the larger East-West confrontation.

Most United States allies, and particularly other members of the Contact Group, are disappointed with the direction of United States policy. The West German government, for example, maintains that African governments that depend on Cuban troops would be more likely to request their withdrawal if the West offered them cooperation rather than confrontation. Bonn rightly regards Angola as the most important front-line state on the Namibian issue and believes that Angola must play a major role in any settlement there.

France, too, has begun to develop a new line toward Africa, especially toward the socialists in Africa. The government of President Francois Mitterrand is far more sympathetic to African fears of South African military intervention than was the administration of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Even the British Conservative government senses that United States coziness with Pretoria may be too much for the black states. British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington has been laboring vigorously to convince black Commonwealth members that United States closeness to Pretoria might give the United States an unmatched ability to influence Pretoria's decisions and, therefore, that they must support the Contact Group's efforts. Such support has not been easy to obtain. The United States veto of August 31 in the United Nations represented the first public breech of unity within the Contact Group. If Africans know that European states are critical of the Reagan administration's policies, how can they be expected to stifle their criticism?

In this atmosphere, the United States launched its efforts to bring the Contact Group back to life and to reopen serious negotiations. In October-November, 1981, a Contact Group delegation toured African capitals seeking agreement from the front-line states, Nigeria, South Africa, and SWAPO and other Namibian parties. The initiative is first seeking consensus on a constitution that establishes three branches of government, an elected constituent assembly that would assure "fair representation" of different political groups, perhaps on a proportional basis, and a declaration of fundamental rights, including "protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property." Such protections draw upon various United Nations documents, including its Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.

These arrangements are to be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the constituent assembly. Once having secured agreement to the constitutional guarantees, added no doubt at Pretoria's insistence, then the parties to the agreement will begin the haggling over the transitional and procedural issues. The implementation is to be started in January, 1982, and an independent Namibia is to be achieved by January, 1983.

South Africa's first reservations (or requirements) were:

1. an advance agreement must be reached on entrenched clauses guaranteeing minority rights and future elections;
2. the United Nations must rescind its recognition of SWAPO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people" in order to assure that it is unbiased;
3. soldiers of the United Nations task force who will monitor the election must wear the uniforms of

their own national armies and not the blue helmets of the United Nations. Pretoria maintains that United Nations uniforms would give SWAPO a psychological advantage. The task force should be composed of members of the five Western countries and Nigeria;

4. SWAPO should not be allowed military bases inside Namibia during the election, and Angola must ensure that Cuban forces do not move south of a prescribed line.

It is unlikely that all parties will agree immediately to all these demands; most likely, SWAPO and its African allies will have their own set of demands that will slow the process still further. But there is some reason for guarded optimism. The Angolan Foreign Minister quickly labeled the Contact Group plan "an important step forward."[12] Even if agreement is reached on South Africa's terms, most observers expect SWAPO to win an open election.

The South African strategy is not clear, and observers remain skeptical. Some see South Africa's general acceptance of the plan as a return to the dual policy followed during the last Contact Group initiative (1978-1980). This was a policy of keeping as many options open for as long as possible and playing along with the international settlement process while South Africa sought to weaken SWAPO and to strengthen the internal parties. This was termed "creeping UDI"** in the sense that increasing government and administrative responsibilities were devolved to the DTA. This also avoided a confrontation with the West by keeping negotiations alive. Yet in the end, nothing came of it. In that process, bargaining over details took two years before it bogged down.

If Pretoria chooses, it can play the same game again, and meanwhile the Reagan administration will do its best to sweeten the pot for South Africa. This time, however, Pretoria must realize that the West may be at the end of its tether; if it wants the West to fend off economic sanctions, Pretoria must grasp the nettle. After its recent invasion of Angola and with a more amenable administration in Washington, Pretoria may well understand that the time is propitious to secure the best terms it can expect. As a senior SADF man said privately, in his view South Africa "must" obtain a settlement while President Reagan is in office.[13]

Space constraints prevent detailed discussion of the military balance, the efforts on the part of South Africa and its Defense Force to establish a South-West Africa Territory Force, and to have in place a military force trained and equipped and perhaps even officered by the SADF and presumably sympathetic to at least key elements of the South African position.[14] Suffice it to say here that the operations have been impressive and that, without outside assistance to SWAPO, it will be difficult to unseat Pretoria's chosen proxies. Yet the ascendancy of Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe over the forces of former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and former president of the United African National Council Bishop Abel Muzorewa cannot help but sober the South Africans and their allies in Namibia and Angola. Opponents of the status quo are not alone. The specter of Soviet assistance and possible direct involvement and the impact of the OAU and its member states may well force the Western world to respond with some sympathy to SWAPO and the nationalist cause in Namibia. The settlement process seems to be back on track, the slow track, but whether it will reach agreement and implementation acceptable to all parties is problematic.

The vulnerability of Angola's MPLA, even before it gained power in Luanda, prompted socialist bloc and Western, as well as African, support and intervention on behalf of opposing factions. This has, in turn, made Angola and consequently Namibia a cold war or East-West issue only casually founded on the realities of life in Namibia. That Washington and Moscow/Havana should see the Namibian outcome as part of an ideological issue in which their reputations as superpowers are at stake adds gravity to each development in that territory. Namibia is very much an international cause, and for many of the powerful actors, the symbol is the substance. ■

**UDI, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, was declared by the British colony of Southern Rhodesia in 1965 in defiance of Great Britain.

[12]*Financial Times*, September 29, 1981.

[13]As quoted in the *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), vol. 81, no. 11 (September 11, 1981), p. 1256.

[14]See chapter 11 in my forthcoming book on blacks in the South African Armed Forces, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982.

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 100)

Not surprisingly, the major sources of aid to Africa remained the multilateral banks and former colonial powers, especially France.

United States bilateral assistance to Africa under the Reagan administration has remained around 14 percent of United States bilateral aid worldwide. The continued priority of Africa in United States foreign policy reflects the administration's emphasis on Africa as an arena for East-West conflict and its specific commitment to provide leadership in resolving the issue of Namibian independence.

Several of President Reagan's other policies have

influenced the emphasis of United States bilateral aid programs, the mix of types of aid programs, and their distribution. These policy shifts were reflected in President Reagan's revision of the 1982 foreign assistance budget and are likely to be more prominent in the 1983 budget. They include a decrease in the level of development assistance and an increase in the level of Economic Support Fund monies for the region, accelerating a trend already evident. Second, more funds are being allocated to countries regarded as strategically important to the United States —e.g., the Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire and Liberia. Interestingly, the relatively high level of assistance to Zimbabwe set by the Carter administration will continue, despite efforts to reduce it by Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) and other conservative Republicans who regard Zimbabwe as dangerously Marxist. Countries whose aid levels have been reduced (but not eliminated) are those of less strategic importance to the United States, those seen in Washington as having ineffective economic policies, or those considered unfriendly to the United States. These countries include Tanzania, Mali, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta. One regional African program that continues to be funded at a level set in the Carter administration is the Sahel Development Program (covering eight Sahelian countries). The continued high levels of this program are surprising: the program is strongly developmental in orientation; the countries involved are of little strategic significance to the United States; and several have economic policies of questionable effectiveness. The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in Libyan threats to countries in the region. Should the Libyan threat disappear, aid levels to Sahelian countries may well fall significantly.

The United States is also emphasizing African economic policy reform. The obstacles to development created by the economic policies in many African countries have long been recognized, including the setting of low food prices that benefit urban consumers but discourage rural food producers and so reduce overall agricultural production and growth.

The emphasis on policy reform appears to focus largely on the IMF, with the United States pressing it to strengthen the conditionality requirements for its balance of payments programs. The effect of this policy on United States bilateral aid to Africa is less clear. Other United States objectives in providing aid tend to take precedence over using aid as leverage for policy reform in recipient countries (even when United States aid is of sufficient size to offset the likely political costs of such reforms, which it seldom is).

The other major thrust in United States economic policies is a commitment to support and encourage greater United States private sector involvement in developing countries, "unleashing the private sector," as Reagan officials are fond of saying. In Africa, this policy is in large part a more vocal continuation of the policies of previous administrations: Export-Import Bank loans for exports to Africa; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's political risk insurance for investment in the region; and funding by the Trade and Development Program (associated with AID) for investment feasibility studies and other business planning projects and reimbursable technical assistance abroad. Another trade promotion device used frequently in the past is sponsoring high-level trade missions to Africa. However, the real test will come in follow-up activities. The administration has also continued to give high-level support for the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee for Nigeria, a group of United States and Nigerian agribusiness officials interested in boosting United States agribusiness investment in Nigeria.

A potentially innovative aspect of the policy of supporting the private sector in development involves the use of bilateral assistance programs. There has been a relatively slow start in defining and implementing this policy. A new Bureau for Private Enterprise has been created in the Agency for International Development but that bureau has a very modest budget ($10.5 million in 1982 for new activities out of a total AID budget of $1.7 billion requested from Congress). Its budget is smaller, in fact, than many single AID projects abroad. Thus far in Africa three countries have been selected as target countries—the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Zimbabwe—but nothing more has been planned apart from "reconnaissance missions," to identify opportunities for combining government assistance and private sector activities.

Admittedly, it is more difficult to come up with innovative, concrete proposals for United States government promotion of private sector activity in developing countries than to state general policies. And it will be especially difficult in Africa. Yet the new administration has made "unleashing the private sector" the centerpiece of its economic policies toward less developed countries. If concrete and effective programs do not emerge, the emphasis on the private sector will be seen as an absence of policy, both by the United States private sector and by African governments.

THE CHALLENGES FACING THE UNITED STATES

The Reagan administration is still young, and its economic and political policies are still maturing. Yet one thing is clear: United States relations with African countries will be greatly affected by

whether and how the issue of Namibian independence is resolved.*

An optimistic approach assumes that Namibian independence will be obtained in the near future in a way that is acceptable to all parties, with the United States taking the leadership role. As a result, it will be expected to be the leader in providing economic assistance for Namibian reconstruction and development. This will involve a major commitment of assistance funds to the country and an effort to persuade other donors to do the same. In years of tight foreign assistance budgets (are there ever any other years?), a painful reordering of assistance priorities within Africa and probably worldwide may be necessary.

But whatever the costs of finding assistance funds for Namibia, the benefits of a successful United States policy would represent a clear triumph for an administration that has been sharply criticized at home and abroad for its handling of foreign policy. In Africa it would open up opportunities for the development and export of Namibian minerals and would foster closer relations with other black African countries. Such relations could help facilitate United States trade and investment in the entire region. In addition, if the resolution of the Namibia issue also leads to greater political stability in Angola, a withdrawal of Cuban troops and the establishment of United States diplomatic relations with that resource-rich country, the economic benefits to the Angolans and to the United States private sector (already involved in Angola in the production of petroleum and gas) could be substantial.

To take a more pessimistic (and some argue, more realistic) view, if the South African government fails to agree to an independence plan acceptable to all parties, the United States initiative on Namibia will probably be seen in Africa—rightly or wrongly—as no more than a cover for establishing closer relations with Pretoria. If such relations are maintained after a failure in the Namibian independence initiative (and, given right-wing Republican sympathies for South Africa, it may be politically difficult for the Reagan administration to back away from its policy of "constructive engagement" with Pretoria), United States political and economic ties with black African countries might be seriously affected.

The issue of Namibian independence may continue to dominate United States and African relations for some time. There are, nevertheless, other important challenges and dilemmas facing United States economic policies in Africa.

*For details see the article by Kenneth Grundy in this issue.

The first dilemma involves contradictions in the administration's approach to encouraging the expansion of the United States private sector in Africa and elsewhere. Government programs, like the Export-Import Bank, are obviously important to realizing this policy (especially since the competitors of United States business in Europe and Japan receive extensive support and subsidies from their own governments). Yet the Reagan administration's policies of cutting government programs and budgets sharply and its generally laissez-faire approach to business tend to limit, rather than to expand, its ability to support United States business abroad.

A second and related dilemma is the coordination of United States government foreign economic programs—Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), AID, and others—for maximum effectiveness in supporting United States business abroad. This, again, is a policy pursued by Japan and OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. However, in the United States these programs are operated by separate institutions with separate missions, separate constituencies and separate bureaucracies and managements. Effective coordination has eluded previous administrations. An effort late in the Carter administration to promote better coordination of some foreign economic programs through the creation of an umbrella agency—the International Development Coordination Administration—was strongly resisted by virtually all the executive branch agencies affected. By the end of the Carter administration, this effort was widely regarded as a failure. The Reagan administration shows no signs of attempting such coordination, and there does not appear to be anyone in the White House (because of institutional resistance, active presidential support is essential) with sufficient interest or influence to lead such efforts.

A third economic policy dilemma derives from the emphasis on economic policy reform as an important condition for receiving assistance, particularly multilateral assistance from the International Monetary Fund and, to a lesser sense, from the World Bank. A vigorous pursuit of this policy—however laudable in theory—could raise the same problems that the Carter human rights policy raised: the inevitable contradiction between a basic principle and actual policies, leading to the defeat or compromise of principle where immediate United States interests are involved; and a consequent confusion or cynicism both at home and abroad about the seriousness of United States commitment to principle. For example, the strong push for stricter conditionality in IMF loans could

provoke economic or political problems in countries of special significance to the United States, e.g., Liberia or Zaire, if they lose desperately needed IMF funds because they fail to accept or meet conditions. (In some cases, governments often argue, accepting IMF conditions themselves can lead to serious domestic political instabilities.) This situation has not yet arisen in Africa, but it is a potential danger in a region where problems of economic crisis and economic mismanagement are great, particularly in several countries of strategic or political importance to the United States.

The fourth, and in some ways the most fundamental, dilemma facing United States economic policies in Africa arises from the nature of the economic problems in the region and the United States response. The Reagan administration is preoccupied with immediate security issues, particularly Soviet involvement in Africa. On the other hand, the Africans are preoccupied with their immediate economic crises and their discouraging long-run development prospects. They argue, with considerable merit, that it is their economic problems that tempt Soviet, Cuban and Libyan involvement in the region. Moreover, the United States private sector is unlikely to become significantly engaged in many African countries, as long as they face serious economic problems. The most appropriate response to economic problems in most African countries is through economic assistance.

The stated emphasis in United States aid to the region is to meet security threats; assistance to long-run economic development is not ignored, but it is played down. Thus far, the overall size of United States aid to Africa has not suffered disproportionately in budget cuts, and the increasing proportion of Economic Support Funds may actually improve the administration's ability to respond quickly and flexibly to Africa's most immediate economic needs. But in the coming years, with continuing tight aid budgets and competing priority needs elsewhere in the world, the question in United States foreign policy toward Africa may become more sharply drawn: whether the United States can protect and advance its security interests in the region while providing relatively small assistance programs and downplaying the serious economic problems facing African countries and their genuine need for international assistance.

Without a clearly articulated United States policy that recognizes the importance of Africa's fundamental economic issues, the Africans may come to see the United States as uninterested in their primary concerns. And without appropriate and effective programs—ours, those of other rich countries and, above all, of the Africans themselves—the United States may find itself preoccupied with putting out brushfires on the continent without ever dealing with the causes that ignite them. ■

MOZAMBIQUE

(Continued from page 114)

italist nations. Independent Mozambique has theoretically adopted a policy of nonalignment. As with many third world nations, professed nonalignment means a search for diverse international relations in order to attract aid and trade. But soon after the Portuguese left, in 1977 FRELIMO signed a 20-year cooperation and friendship treaty with the Soviet Union—one of four such treaties in Africa. Machel's policy and statements underlined his declaration of allegiance at the third congress, when he stated that Mozambique regards as its "natural allies the socialist countries and the Marxist-Leninist parties."[11]

Since the enunciation of its international posture, FRELIMO stood behind its policy by supporting the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when the issues came up for a vote in the United Nations. It sends about 10,000 schoolchildren annually to Cuba, which also provides Mozambique with teachers, technicians and military instructors. FRELIMO sent dos Santos to Moscow for the 26th congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union where on February 27, 1981, he conveyed "proletarian greetings from the Communists and working people of Mozambique and from our Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO party."[12] But the West has furnished major sums to bail out Mozambique's faltering economy. Mozambique, for instance, has been given credit lines of $100 million from Brazil, $125 million from Great Britain and $25 million from France. The United States has donated $50 million in humanitarian aid to Mozambique since its independence.

In addition to Mozambique's perception of its "natural allies in the socialist countries," Maputo believes that the Soviet Union's support will be more useful than the West's in Mozambique's relations with South Africa. In fact, Machel accused the United States of encouraging "South Africa's large-scale invasion of Angola" in August, 1981.[13]

[11]"Mozambique," Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-1977* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978), p. B297.

[12]Originally printed in *Izvestiya*, March 1, 1981, and reprinted and translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), (Africa and Middle East issue), March 3, 1981, p. T1.

[13]Hanlon, "Machel Accuses US of 'Aggressive' Acts," *The Guardian*, October 7, 1981.

Relations between Maputo and Washington have never been very cordial for long. But they hit a low point early in 1980, when FRELIMO expelled four American diplomats together with two of their wives for "United States Central Intelligence Agency activities." The Mozambican government stated that the United States embassy was engaged in "espionage, conducted subversive activities, [and] interfered in the country's internal affairs."[14] The United States denied the allegations.

Mozambique experienced its own direct assault from the South Africa Defense Forces in January, 1981, when South Africa struck at a reputed headquarters of the African National Congress (ANC) just outside Maputo. The raid left 14 dead, including two South African soldiers. Pretoria accused the ANC of mounting a sabotage campaign within South Africa from Mozambican territory. Mozambican officials denied that they lent sanctuary to guerrillas for raids into South Africa, although FRELIMO sides with the struggle of the Africans against the white government in South Africa. In a demonstration of support for FRELIMO, the Soviet Union has stationed warships in Maputo harbor since the assault.

Despite some minor relaxation at the lower end of the economy as it pursues its new war against the enemies within, Mozambique remains firmly committed to marxism in both foreign and domestic policies. ■

[14]Maputo Domestic Service, March 4, 1981, carried in *FBIS* (Africa and Middle East issue), March 5, 1981.

NIGERIA UNDER SHAGARI

(Continued from page 110)

local Muslims, a problem resolved by a diplomatic governor.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND DEMOCRACY

Nigeria is a vigorous nation, with able and ambitious leaders. Many state governments, for instance, are vigorously launching development programs in education and health, often beyond their financial means. But the ability of President Shagari and the state governors to cope with Nigeria's problems is dependent on satisfying the extraordinarily high expectations for jobs and material improvements that petronaira (petrodollars), the visible affluence of the few, and political promises have inspired.

In 1981-1982, Nigeria is experiencing a severe contraction in federal revenues, because of the world oil glut and Nigeria's own high oil-pricing policies. This has led to a sharper oil export decline than was necessary. Production fell from 2.09 mbd in January, 1981, to .708 mbd in August, exports from 1.89 mbd to .508 mbd. Net government revenue from oil exports in August, 1981, was 26 percent of January revenues.[11] Nigeria's 1981 budget was based on sales of 1.9 mbd at $36 a barrel with a planned deficit of 33.6 percent of retained federal revenues. Recent estimates were for a decline of 30 percent in expected revenues.

The economic effects of government retrenchment and deficit spending will be severe. Federal and state governments have halted new employment; extended payments on development projects will extend greatly the already disruptive delays, generating private sector unemployment. Reductions in imports and deficit spending will accelerate inflation on basic commodities, including food; actual inflation in mid-1981 was estimated at "multiples of the official rate" of 10 percent.

The urban and rural poor will suffer most, and the better organized—the urban workers and college students—will protest the most energetically. The Shagari government will not be able to create more new states unless they are politically imperative, because of the large start-up administrative and capital costs.

Political strains and conflicts have already increased government restrictions on constitutional rights. There has been an increase in police bans on public meetings and processions; bans were in effect in some major cities in late 1981, including a ban of indefinite duration in Lagos, the capital. There has been a drastic reduction in press freedom since Nigeria's return to civilian rule in late 1979, although Nigeria's press remains the freest in Africa. While new newspapers continue to be established, 75 percent of the print and electronic media are controlled by state and federal governments, which largely disseminate party views, removing staff members who protest. In August, 1981, seven senior editors of four opposition newspapers were arrested by huge police details and were charged with conspiracy and sedition and knowingly publishing false news. Shagari has observed that the police acted on their own to prevent a breakdown of law and order, a statement no one believes.

Today, Nigeria is a working democracy in a prospering but highly inegalitarian society. Its new democratic institutions will certainly survive current strains. But the degrees of freedom are narrowing in Nigeria as the parties scramble to consolidate and extend their power in preparation for the 1983 elections. ■

[11]M. Quinlan, "OPEC's Formula for Recovery," *West Africa*, November 9, 1981, p. 2621.

KENYA

(Continued from page 130)

against them. While this indirect oppression was not laudable, it did stabilize a certain configuration of forces: specifically the relationship between local politicians and administrators, and between local authorities as a whole and the central ministries. Under Moi, the central ministries continue to hold tight purse strings, but local politicians have become increasingly assertive, putting local administrators under considerable pressure and demanding that the members of Parliament for their locality be more accountable to them. Further, they have a powerful ally in the Minister of Local Government, Maasai leader Stanley Oloitipitip, a longtime political associate of Moi's. Finally, local politicians benefit from the fact that the legitimacy of Moi's regime rests on its inclusion of previously excluded groups and categories.

In Kenya, even minor shifts of power can deeply affect political relationships, either between branches of the government or within them. The question is, what form will the bid for resources take in the triangle between the central government, local government and the middle class, under the changed relationships of Moi's regime?

The evidence suggests that local government is increasingly challenging its subordinate role and its lack of access to resources, while the middle class is taking advantage of the new political alliances to act more overtly (if not always harmoniously among its factions) to preserve and promote local government as its resource base.[19] Accordingly, central government can no longer use Kenyatta's style of control, but must try to manage local government through the co-optation of the new alliances. The difficulty Moi's regime faces in achieving this was evidenced in 1981 by the defeat in Parliament of its bill proposing a Local Government Service Commission, which would have removed local administrators from the jurisdiction of the local councillors and placed them under central control.

Thus, middle class politics, which is located in the heart of the government and which was a vital element in the legitimation and consolidation of Moi's regime, has proved to be an unruly servant that may yet pose challenges to Moi's rule.

Kenya has been more dramatically affected by the change of regime than has commonly been acknowledged. On the surface, it lives up to its reputation as a well-run, democratic country. But political and economic tensions lie close to the surface, some of them inherited from the Kenyatta era, others created by the realignment of political forces.

On the economic front, an extremely able civil service, with some outstanding financial leaders at the helm (Mwai Kibaki among them), is seeking to cope with the crises thrown up by the 1980's. The urgent balance of payments problem is being dealt with by a series of well-reasoned import regulations, introduced in November, while food shortages, which caused so much hardship early in the year and necessitated the import of American grain, were being tackled by sensible policies aimed at reorganizing marketing, farmers' credit and other aspects of food production.[20] The government constantly monitors the progress of the 1979-1983 Development Plan—the fourth since independence—which caters to all aspects of Kenya's economic and social development.

But the implementation of Kenya's economic strategies have always proved difficult. The government mechanisms designed to manage Kenya's rich agricultural resources seemed to be in trouble in 1981. The Kenya Meat Commission, the Kenya Co-operative Creameries and the National Cereals and Produce Board all came in for criticism for mismanagement or inefficiency, while the Coffee Board was the subject of a criminal investigation into the illegal sale of coffee. Farmers complained that the Agricultural Finance Corporation set difficult loan repayment conditions and was inefficient in the issuing of loans. Within the ministries, performance was affected by the low morale of civil servants, as the new regime's personnel changes began to disrupt long-established departmental hierarchies.

Meanwhile, Kenyans at all levels scramble for resources that are finally appearing to be finite (nowhere was this more apparent than in the case of land). At the top, appropriation of wealth continues in sometimes blatant forms. In the middle, winners stand to make substantial material gains, at the expense of those further down. At the bottom, peasants, the marginally employed and the unemployed have to scrabble to survive under the increasing hardships of recession, inflation and food scarcity. The gap between rich and poor in Kenya has never been wider.

On the political front, debate has never been more lively, and almost no aspect of Kenyan soci-

[19]Observations during fieldwork in 1981, specifically in Kisii, Thika and Nairobi, provide the basis of this evidence. Sources were Council Minutes and Reports, interviews with politicians and administrators, and press coverage.

[20]The November *Quarterly Economic Review*, released by the Ministry for Economic Development and Planning, summarizes the prognoses and policies of 1981. *Weekly Review*, November 20, 1981, gives excerpts from the *Review*.

ety is off limits for criticism and debate. Charles Njonjo, who in his 17 years as Attorney General came to personify the rule of law in Kenya, continues to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the constitution in his new capacity as Minister for Constitutional and Home Affairs. But the intensifying factionalism—with its potential threat to the unity and stability of the regime—has set the leaders on edge, and they tread a narrow path between repression and license.

The paradox the Moi regime faces is embodied in its guiding doctrine of Nyayoism, which on the one hand promotes "peace, love and unity" and democratic rights enshrined in an inviolable constitution, and on the other hand invokes unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the state and its personification, the President. In its preoccupation with its security and legitimacy, the regime transforms all problems into confrontation between nyayo and anti-nyayo forces—even problems of economic development. It is not yet clear whether the footsteps that led from Moi's monumental predecessor into Moi's contentious present will provide an adequate path for the future stable development of Kenya. ■

LAND POLICY AND POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE

(Continued from page 124)

interest, stating in *Growth with Equity* that

> individual landowners share their property with the state, which is the sovereign custodian of the natural assets, and the state can restrict the uses and practices that are carried on . . . which are contrary to the national interest.

Second, the recommendations of the Riddell Commission may require rethinking of the economic assumptions of the resettlement program. If the government accepts minimum wage increases at the level and pace proposed, more effort to increase the productivity of settlement farmers will be required. The question arises whether the amount of land or the availability of agricultural inputs will be sufficient to allow them to increase their productivity. It is not clear whether the government will be able to give enough land to enough settlers to respond both to pressures to increase the size of the program and to keep the settlement farmers from falling below the national minimum wage for agricultural employees. Moreover, the recommendations concerning the compartmentalization of urban and rural families for income-earning purposes may result in a need to find more employment opportunities and to relax the requirements concerning the settlers' right to maintain plots in the traditional peasant farming areas. The implications of this recommendation for women in the work force are also unclear.

Third, the government has exhibited its pragmatism in its lack of specificity concerning the organization of rural development. On the one hand, *Growth with Equity* contemplated the existence of several types of farming enterprises, from communal and cooperative farming ventures to more traditional individual enterprises. On the other hand, in emphasizing the importance of cooperatives and of local district councils in spearheading development in the rural areas, it is not clear what flexibility these bodies will have in organizing and mobilizing for development vis-à-vis the central government and its inherited statutory authority to direct such work. Moreover, the whole question of security of tenure in the settlement schemes and in other rural development projects is unresolved. Are temporary permits to be temporary until more suitable legislation is evolved? Or are they to be permanent and transform the settlers into tenants of the state on their plots?

There can be no conclusion concerning processes of development that have just begun. But two projections may be offered. Zimbabwe has secured enough overseas investment and mobilized enough of its own resources so that rural development programs may be able to counteract rather than simply reflect the impoverished traditional peasant farming sector. And the government has combined broad development objectives with considerable pragmatism. It is to be hoped that the pace of economic and social change in the country will permit the government to continue on this circumspect course. ■

REPORT FROM ZIMBABWE

(Continued from page 120)

vices in rural areas. In addition, under the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, Great Britain will provide grant money for the purchase of European farm land for resettlement.[2]

But there is a strong and vocal element in the black society that wants to accelerate black control of the economy. Mugabe is mindful of this element and announced steps in December, 1981, to speed up the land redistribution program. However, he must also counter the attempts of disgruntled whites to undermine his government. Mugabe must balance contending factions in Zimbabwe if his government is to survive as an economic and political force in southern Africa. ■

[2]For a detailed discussion of the land resettlement program, see the article by John Harbeson, "Land Policy and Politics in Zimbabwe," on page 121ff. of this issue.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1982, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See also *Poland*)

Jan. 4—Meeting in Brussels, the foreign ministers of the EEC issue a communiqué saying they "utterly disapprove of the development of the situation in Poland . . . [and] appeal urgently to the Polish authorities to end . . . the state of martial law." The EEC also says that it has "taken note of the economic measures" adopted by the U.S. with regard to the Soviet Union and will consult with the U.S.

Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Jan. 13—In Cairo, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. says that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has agreed to a "very firm and clear commitment to intensify efforts" to speed negotiations with Israel on Palestinian autonomy.

Jan. 19—In Cairo, Israeli and Egyptian negotiators announce that they have resolved most issues involved in the return of the balance of the Sinai to Egypt by April 25.

Jan. 27—In Jerusalem, Secretary Haig meets with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and proposes new plans for resolving Israeli-Egyptian differences over Palestinian autonomy.

Jan. 29—In London, it is reported that, on his trip from the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. told reporters that he sees little chance of agreement between Egypt and Israel over Palestinian autonomy before the return of the rest of the Sinai to Egypt on April 25.

Jan. 31—The Israeli Cabinet agrees to the participation of Britain, Italy, France and the Netherlands in the peacekeeping force for the Sinai after April 25.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Poland*)

Jan. 11—In Brussels, in the 1st emergency meeting ever held by NATO, alliance representatives condemn "the imposition of martial law in Poland" and the "active support" of the Soviet Union for the suppression in Poland of "efforts by the Polish people for national renewal and reform . . . ."

United Nations

Jan. 18—The UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)-sponsored International Program for Development of Communications opens its 2d session in Acapulco, Mexico.

Jan. 20—The U.S. vetoes a Security Council compromise resolution calling for consideration of unspecified measures to reverse the Israeli action in the Golan Heights and urging the adoption of undefined measures to cut off all aid to Israel; 9 nations (the necessary minimum) vote for the resolution, and 5 abstain.

Jan. 25—The UNESCO conference in Acapulco ends its sessions; among other programs it adopts a program to aid journalism in developing nations.

ALBANIA

Jan. 14—Communist party leader Enver Hoxha appoints First Deputy Prime Minister Adil Carcani to succeed Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, who died last month.

ALGERIA

(See *Lebanon*)

ANGOLA

Jan. 7—Angop, the official press agency, reports that South African forces attacked Angolan troops in Angola 190 miles inside the Angola-Namibia border.

Jan. 15—In Paris, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker meets with Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge.

BRAZIL

Jan. 14—It is reported that U.S. financier Daniel K. Ludwig is abandoning his development project, Jari, in the Amazon region; the government has agreed to take over the project.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 12—The Foreign Ministry "lodges a strong protest" against the U.S. decision to sell military equipment to Taiwan.

CUBA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; France*)

Jan. 2—President Hosni Mubarak dismisses the Cabinet; Mubarak names Ahmed Fuad Mohieddin Prime Minister, a post which Mubarak has held since becoming President.

Jan. 4—Mubarak swears in the new Cabinet.

Jan. 25—Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali confirms reports that his government has requested assistance on industrial projects from the Soviet Union.

Jan. 30—On the first stop of his 10-day trip, President Mubarak arrives in Rome for talks with Pope John Paul II.

EL SALVADOR

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 1—For the first time since the civil war began, the country suffers a nationwide power blackout when rebels attack a hydroelectric dam.

Jan. 7—Government forces begin a major offensive against anti-government guerrillas in areas around San Salvador.

Jan. 21—In Washington, D.C., U.S. Deputy State Department spokesman Alan D. Romberg says the U.S. administration is pleased with the pace of the government's investigation into the deaths of 3 U.S. nuns and a missionary in 1980.

Jan. 26—In Washington, D.C., 2 private organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Americas

Watch Committee, issue a report claiming that the government of El Salvador has been responsible for the disappearance of more than 600 people; the report urges the U.S. Congress not to continue military and economic assistance to El Salvador.

Jan. 27—In a letter to President Reagan, the commanders of the anti-government guerrilla group, Farabundo Martí National Liberation, ask the U.S. to accept a negotiated settlement to the civil war "without preconditions by any of the parties to the conflict."

Anti-government guerrillas attack Ilopango Air Base near San Salvador, damaging an estimated 30 to 50 percent of the aircraft on the ground.

Jan. 28—In Washington, D.C., U.S. President Ronald Reagan certifies to Congress that the military-civilian junta is making a "concerted" effort to control its security forces and protect human rights.

The New York Times carries a report that government forces conducted a massacre of peasants in the mountain region of Morazan Province in December; villagers accuse the government of killing 733 peasants, mostly women, children and the old. Army spokesman Colonel Alfonso Cotto says the reports are "totally false."

FINLAND

Jan. 18—In presidential elections yesterday and today, Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto wins the presidency; he will be the first Social Democratic President.

FRANCE

(See also *Pakistan*)

Jan. 4—Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali; the French government agrees to sell Egypt 20 Mirage fighter planes and surface-to-air missiles; the sale is valued at $1 billion.

Jan. 7—The government confirms reports that it has agreed to sell the Nicaraguan government $17-million worth of "defensive" military equipment.

Jan. 14—Foreign Minister Cheysson confirms the government's plan to help rebuild the Iraqi nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in June, 1981.

Jan. 16—The Constitutional Council rules that the government must pay an additional $5.7 billion to the stockholders of the investment houses, banks and industrial groups that it plans to nationalize.

Jan. 18—5 Soviet-made antitank rockets are fired at a Lyons nuclear plant; there are no injuries and the damage to the plant is minor. The Pacifist and Ecologist Committee claims responsibility for the attack.

Jan. 23—The government signs a 25-year agreement with the Soviet Union to purchase about 280 billion cubic feet of Siberian natural gas a year. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in 1984.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 13—A government spokesman reports that the government will not ask West German companies not to supply components for the Siberian gas pipeline.

Jan. 22—Parliament approves a $104.5-billion budget for 1982, an increase of 3.2 percent over 1981; $19.2 billion will go toward the military, an increase of 5.2 percent over 1981.

GHANA

Jan. 2—Leader of the military government Jerry J. Rawlings suspends the constitution, bans political parties and dissolves Parliament. He establishes a Provisional National Defense Council to administer the government.

Jan. 4—Former President Hilla Limann and 17 of his associates are arrested; the new government freezes the assets of all the officials of the Limann government and their families. Rawlings has accused the Limann government of corruption and of bringing "total economic ruin" to Ghana.

Jan. 11—The government restores diplomatic relations with Libya, which were broken off in 1980.

GREECE

Jan. 18—Government spokesman Dimitrios Maroudas confirms reports that the government has agreed to resume repairing and servicing Soviet commercial and naval supply ships in a state-controlled shipyard.

GUATEMALA

Jan. 15—Continuing violence between anti-government guerrillas and government forces is reported throughout the country; it is reported that about 300 people a month are being killed in the fighting.

HAITI

Jan. 10—Haitian exile leader Bernard Sansaricq claims that his National Popular Haitian party has taken control of Tortuga, an island off the Haitian coast.

Jan. 11—Interior Minister Jean-Marie Chanoine says government troops have put down Sansaricq's coup attempt; 8 rebels are reported killed.

Jan. 14—The U.S. Coast Guard reports Sansaricq's arrest; he is charged with violating U.S. neutrality laws.

HONDURAS

(See also *Nicaragua*)

Jan. 27—Roberto Suazo Córdova is inaugurated as President, succeeding General Policarpo Paz García; he is the first civilian President since 1972.

INDIA

Jan. 12—A. R. Antulay, chief minister of Maharashtra State and a leader of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress party, submits his resignation; a Bombay High Court recently found him guilty of extortion.

Jan. 15—Prime Minister Gandhi appoints 10 new Cabinet ministers to implement her recently announced economic program.

Jan. 18—Nearly 6,000 labor union members and union supporters are arrested on the eve of a national one-day general strike called to protest the government's economic policies.

Jan. 19—A nationwide general strike is held, but there are no demonstrations.

Jan. 20—It is reported that nearly 25,000 labor activists were arrested in anticipation of yesterday's strike; most are released.

Jan. 31—Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi meets in New Delhi with Indian Foreign Minister Chinmoy Gharekhan; they agree to establish a commission to improve relations between the 2 countries.

IRAN

(See *Syria*)

IRAQ

(See also *France*)

Jan. 3—The Iraqi press agency claims that Israeli jet fighters violated Iraqi airspace for the 2nd time in 5 days.

IRELAND

Jan. 27—By a vote of 82 to 81, Parliament defeats the government's budget proposals. Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald submits his government's resignation.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; Iraq; Saudi Arabia*)

Jan. 7—The Cabinet votes to compensate 1,400 Jewish families who must leave their homes in the Sinai when the area is returned to Egypt in April, 1982. They will receive approximately $188,000 per family.

ITALY

Jan. 28—Antiterrorist forces stage a raid on an apartment in Padua and free kidnapped General James L. Dozier unharmed; 5 people are arrested. Dozier was taken hostage 42 days ago by the terrorist group, the Red Brigades.

JAPAN

Jan. 18—A spokesman for the Finance Ministry reports a 1981 trade surplus with the U.S. of $13.4 billion, almost twice that of 1980.

Jan. 30—The Cabinet approves the proposed trade liberalization measures to revise or modify tariffs on 67 items.

KOREA, SOUTH

Jan. 1—President Chun Doo Hwan lifts curfew restrictions that have been in force since 1945.

Jan. 3—President Chun replaces Prime Minister Nam Duck Woo with Yoo Chang Soon.

LEBANON

Jan. 13—In Beirut, senior Algerian embassy official Rabah Kharwa is assassinated by unknown assailants.

LIBYA

(See *Ghana; Poland*)

NICARAGUA

(See also *France*)

Jan. 9—The Honduran government lodges an official protest with the Nicaraguan government, claiming that Nicaraguan military forces have made incursions into Nicaragua.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

Jan. 11—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq partially lifts press censorship.

Jan. 12—The London-based Amnesty International says that human rights violations in Pakistan are increasing steadily.

Jan. 14—Government forces arrest 480 people suspected of belonging to an anti-government organization, Al Zulfikar.

Jan. 26—In a meeting with French President François Mitterrand, President Zia says his government has neither the intention nor the capacity to produce nuclear arms. His comments follow a report made yesterday by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that Pakistan would be able to detonate a nuclear device within three years.

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 13—The government prohibits the sale and circulation of foreign newspapers and magazines that describe the December 29 disappearance of Tommy Manotoc, a Philippine athlete who secretly married President Ferdinand E. Marcos's daughter, Imee, in the United States.

POLAND

(See also *Intl, EEC, NATO; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 1—In a radio broadcast, Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak warns the military not to heed Warsaw Solidarity leader Zbigniew Bujak's call "to listen to their conscience."

In an address at the Vatican, Pope John Paul II says the Church has always supported the rights of workers to establish autonomous trade unions and that Solidarity has become part of the "heritage of the workers of Poland."

Jan. 2—Deputy head of the National Defense Committee Colonel Zdzislaw Malina reports that 90 provincial and city officials have been dismissed because they did not function well under martial law.

Jan. 4—In Warsaw, Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski meets with diplomats from the European Common Market countries.

Jan. 6—In Moscow, the foreign trade ministers of the Soviet Union and Poland sign an $11.8-billion trade agreement.

It is reported that about half the 40,000 troops stationed in Warsaw since December 13 have been removed.

Roman Catholic Archbishop Jozef Glemp denounces as "unethical" the government's attempt to force workers to sign a loyalty oath.

Jan. 7—Warsaw radio reports that some former government officials, including former Deputy Prime Minister Franciszek Kaim, have been indicted.

Universities reopen for senior students.

Jan. 8—Vice Minister for Internal Affairs Boguslaw Stachura tells Parliament that 17 people were killed during the martial law period.

Jan. 9—The government lifts censorship on reports by journalists.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski meets with Archbishop Glemp in Warsaw.

Jan. 10—In Moscow, Foreign Minister Jozef Czyrek meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Telephone service is restored in Warsaw.

Jan. 11—Tass, the Soviet press agency, calls the recent statement by the members of NATO "intolerable interference" in Polish affairs.

Jan. 15—Solidarity leader Zbigniew Bujak, who remains in hiding, urges union members to continue their activities underground through peaceful resistance.

Jan. 17—The government permits the mass celebrated by Archbishop Glemp in Warsaw to be broadcast.

Jan. 19—In Washington, D.C., U.S. President Reagan says that conditions in Poland are moderating but notes that "we're not going to wait forever for improvement in the situation there" before taking additional steps against the Soviet Union and the Polish government.

Jan. 27—U.S. officials report that since martial law was declared, the Polish government has paid $100 million in overdue interest owed to Western banks. The of-

ficials say they believe the money is not coming from the Soviet Union.

Jan. 30—It is reported that 161 Libyan cadets have arrived in Warsaw for training in the use of special weapons.

Jan. 31—Warsaw radio reports that more than 200 people were arrested and 14 were injured in Gdansk when police broke up weekend demonstrations over the recently announced 200 to 400 percent increases in the prices of food and commodities.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 4—Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal denies reports that in a December 30, 1981, speech he said that Saudi Arabia would "accept" Israel if Israel recognized Palestinian rights and returned the occupied Arab lands.

SPAIN

Jan. 15—The Defense Ministry announces the appointment of Lieutenant General Alvaro Lacalle Deloup to replace Lieutentant General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

SUDAN

Jan. 8—The government closes 4 universities because of recent student rioting over increases in the cost of gasoline and sugar.

SYRIA

Jan. 2—In Damascus, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati concludes a 3-day meeting with Syrian President Hafez Assad and Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam.

Jan. 16—In Moscow, Foreign Minister Khaddam concludes two days of talks on the recent Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Soviet chief of staff of the armed forces Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov.

Jan. 18—It is reported in Damascus that the Soviet Union will provide additional arms for Syria.

TAIWAN

(See *China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

TURKEY

(See also *U.S., Terrorism*)

Jan. 19—The government concludes a $600-million trade agreement for 1982 with the Soviet Union.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, NATO; Egypt; France; Greece; Poland; Syria; Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 7—West German officials report that the Soviet government has requested an additional $137 million in credit to help finance the Siberian-West European natural gas pipeline.

Jan. 23—The Central Statistical Administration issues its 1981 annual economic report; 1981 grain harvest figures are omitted.

Jan. 26—Chief ideologue of the Communist party Mikhail A. Suslov dies at the age of 79.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Jan. 16—The government upgrades its relations with the Vatican to full ambassadorial level.

Jan. 21—Members of the National Union of Mineworkers reject a call by their leaders to strike for higher wages.

Jan. 26—The government releases figures showing that the level of unemployment in January reached 3 million, 11.7 percent of the work force.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Jan. 4—National security adviser Richard V. Allen resigns and President Ronald Reagan accepts his resignation.

President Reagan appoints Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark Jr. as his national security adviser with a "direct reporting relationship to the President."

Jan. 5—In Arkansas, U.S. district court Judge William R. Overton rules that Arkansas Act 590, enacted in March, 1981, is a violation of the constitutional guarantees of separation of church and state; the act would require "balanced treatment" in Arkansas classrooms of the theories of evolution and "creation science."

Jan. 12—The White House issues a statement saying that because of the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, President Reagan has issued new guidelines: officials must obtain the approval of their superiors before talking to reporters; the number of people with access to classified documents is to be reduced to the "minimum essential" to conduct government business; all legal means are to be used to identify the source of unauthorized disclosures.

Jan. 14—Speaking in New York City, President Reagan asks business and civic leaders to show the "spirit of shared sacrifice" in making private contributions to take the place of government welfare programs; he says that he believes the recession will end "faster than expected."

Jan. 19—President Reagan defends new restrictions on interviews granted by government officials and his administration's use of lie-detector tests for some Defense Department officials.

Jan. 20—Selective Service director Thomas K. Turnage announces that 18-year-old men who have failed to register for possible military conscription by January 8 (as required by law) will be given a grace period until February 28 to register.

Jan. 21—Attorney General William French Smith announces that Federal Bureau of Investigation director William H. Webster and the Bureau will take over the responsibility for enforcing the nation's drug control laws.

Jan. 23—According to Defense Department officials, some 25 high-ranking officials have been given lie-detector tests in an attempt to find the source of unauthorized disclosures about confidential Defense Department information.

Jan. 25—A ruptured tube in a primary cooling system of the Ginna nuclear power plant in Ontario, New York, bursts and releases some radioactive steam; the plant is shut down.

Jan. 26—President Reagan addresses Congress and the nation in his 1st State of the Union Address, televised from the Capitol. The President says that he will not ask for new taxes or alter his tax reduction program. The President proposes to dismantle the Departments of Education and Energy and to transfer some $47 billion in current federal programs to the states by 1984, including food stamp programs and programs

of aid to dependent children. The President says he expects the fiscal 1982 budget deficit to be under $100 billion and to decline in subsequent years.

Civil Rights

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Jan. 8—Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan says that Section 501)c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code that has heretofore refused tax-exempt status to organizations that practice racial discrimination is being altered. The new ruling gives tax-exempt status to private schools and colleges that practice racial discrimination.

Jan. 12—After widespread protest against the January 8 ruling, President Reagan says that he is "unalterably opposed to racial discrimination in any form" and that he will submit legislation to Congress that will prohibit tax exemptions for "organizations that discriminate on the basis of race."

Jan. 18—President Reagan says that the IRS will withhold tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools until Congress acts.

Economy

Jan. 8—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 8.9 percent in December, 1981; nearly 9.5 million Americans are unemployed.

Jan. 15—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.3 percent in December and only 7 percent for all of 1981.

Jan. 20—The Commerce Department reports that (after an adjustment for inflation) the nation's gross national product (GNP) fell at an annual rate of 5.2 percent in the 4th quarter of 1981.

Jan. 22—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in December and only 8.9 percent in 1981, the lowest rate of increase since 1977.

Jan. 26—In testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul A. Volcker says that continued large federal budget deficits are the main threat to economic recovery and that interest rates will remain high as long as these large deficits continue.

Jan. 28—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.6 percent in December.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, EEC, Middle East; Angola; China; El Salvador; Germany, West; Japan; Poland*)

Jan. 5—President Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt meet in Washington, D.C.; in a joint statement they call on Polish authorities to "end the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore the dialogue with the Church and Solidarity."

Jan. 8—President Reagan appoints Walter J. Stoessel Jr. as Deputy Secretary of State and Lawrence S. Eagleburger as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

The General Electric Company reports that the Commerce Department has refused to license it to ship $175 million in parts for the Siberian-West European gas pipeline to 3 European purchasers because of the U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union.

According to diplomatic sources, the U.S. has asked its European allies not to supply components for the gas pipeline.

Jan. 11—The State Department announces that President Reagan has agreed to permit the government of Taiwan to buy U.S. F-5E fighter planes, not more advanced models.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge holds confidential discussions with Chinese officials in Beijing.

Jan. 13—The first 6 of 60 F-15 fighters sold to Saudi Arabia are shipped to Riyadh.

Jan. 26—Secretary of State Haig meets in Geneva with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko; Haig says that the U.S. will not agree to new strategic arms reduction negotiations until the Polish situation improves.

Jan. 27—In a television interview, President Reagan says that Secretary of State Haig met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Mexico in November, 1981; the State Department has denied that such a meeting took place.

Jan. 28—President Reagan certifies to Congress that the El Salvadoran junta is making "continuing progress" toward political and social reforms; under the Foreign Assistance Act of December, 1981, he must certify progress before El Salvador can receive some $25 million in military and $40 million in economic aid.

Jan. 31—According to Agriculture Department officials, the administration has decided to pay some $71 million in interest due by Poland on U.S.-guaranteed loans used for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products by Poland; this "emergency" action was taken without declaring the loans in default and without public notice.

Labor and Industry

Jan. 8—The Justice Department announces that it is dropping its 13-year-old antitrust action to dismember the International Business Machines Corporation.

The Justice Department settles its antitrust lawsuit against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company when the company agrees to divest itself of some 22 Bell system companies worth some $80 billion that provide most of the nation's local telephone service.

Jan. 14—For the 1st time since going public in 1956, the Ford Motor Company announces that it will not pay a quarterly dividend; the omitted payment is for the 1st quarter of 1982.

Jan. 15—In a 3-1 decision the Federal Trade Commission decides to dismiss its 10-year-old antitrust suit against the nation's 3 largest cereal manufacturers.

Legislation

(See also *Administration*)

Jan. 25—The 2d session of the 97th Congress convenes.

Jan. 29—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rules unconstitutional the so-called one-house veto, which allows either house of Congress to block the action of specific federal agencies. Congress has attached a legislative veto to some 200 laws since the 1930's.

Military

Jan. 7—President Reagan orders the continued registration of young men for possible military service.

Jan. 20—The Air Force signs some $2.2 billion-worth of contracts with Rockwell International Corporation to begin the manufacture of B-1 bombers.

Jan. 23—The CBS television show, "The Uncounted

Enemy, a Vietnam Deception," reports that General William C. Westmoreland and other U.S. officials in Vietnam deliberately underestimated the strength of enemy forces.

Jan. 24—*The New York Times* reports that an unpublished Air Force report reveals that, in addition to spraying herbicides in South Vietnam, the U.S. secretly sprayed herbicides in Laos.

Jan. 26—Westmoreland calls the CBS January 23 report "a reprehensible and irresponsible effort to impugn my character and integrity."

President Reagan approves plans to increase by some $11 billion over the next 5 years the Defense Department purchase of long-range air-transport planes; he also approves an expenditure of $6 billion over 5 years for binary chemical weapons.

Supreme Court

Jan. 13—In a 6-3 decision, the Court overrules a lower court and rules that a police officer does not need a search warrant to accompany an arrested person to his home and seize evidence found there.

Jan. 19—In a 4-4 split decision, the Court upholds a lower court decision that held that the section of the Federal Election Act of 1971 that limited would-be donors to a $1,000 contribution is unconstitutional; consequently, political action committees and independent groups are free to make unlimited donations to presidential candidates.

Jan. 25—The Court agrees to hear an appeal of U.S. district court Judge Marion Callister's December 23 ruling that the extension of the ratification deadline for the Equal Rights Amendment is unconstitutional; the Court issues a stay of the decision until it rules.

Terrorism

Jan. 18—Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Ray, chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, is assassinated.

Jan. 28—Turkish consul general in Los Angeles Kemal Arikan is assassinated there; an Armenian group claims responsibility for the slaying.

URUGUAY

Jan. 22—The government suspends publication of the weekly opposition newspaper *La Democracia* for 8 weeks because it published an article by Carlos Julio Pereira, a leader of the opposition Blanco party.

VATICAN

(See *Poland; U.K., Great Britain*) ■

ZAMBIA

(Continued from page 128)

appointments, however, cannot resolve these disputes, because they reflect deep cleavages in the political economy.[12] Nevertheless, Kaunda was apparently enraged when Elias Chipimo, then director of the Standard Bank in Zambia, warned that coups were becoming the only way to change one-party regimes. His remarks followed a coup in Liberia staged by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. In a display of bitterness toward ex-ministers who had returned to the private sector, Kaunda accused businessmen of being against party and government, and he opposed any return to laissez-faire economics. Kaunda forced Chipimo to resign and subsequently extended UNIP's purview: no party member could serve on the board of a foreign-owned company without Central Committee approval. Consequently, managers and workers were united in their resistance to UNIP and in favor of a more mixed economy (a major alliance against the government in any attempt to implement unpopular IMF or UNIP policies, appeals to "humanism" notwithstanding).

The transition from war to peace in southern Africa and from expansion to recession in the global economy poses almost insurmountable problems for the Zambian leadership. Its preoccupation with the liberation of Zimbabwe has ended, but national development remains as elusive as ever; hence the government's uncertain and contradictory moves toward both reform and repression. Now that the regional crisis has lessened, Kaunda must concentrate on the less glamorous and less glorious task of improving Zambia's economy. The World Bank is cautionary about the scale and speed of this task:

> Future growth requires the allocation of more foreign exchange to mining in the near term and greater emphasis on diversification as well as some basic reforms of institutions and economic policies for the longer term. Zambia's structural inflexibility will take many years to overcome, and meanwhile the country will remain vulnerable to terms of trade fluctuations.[13]

Furthermore, *The Economist* has warned of more immediate political issues confronting the President as he attempts to control demands, restore confidence, revive growth and recapture the initiative.

> . . . change can come only through the government recognizing the real causes of disaffection, or through a coup. It seems more and more likely that the political lid may come off in an explosion. . . . It can be of no comfort to Mr. Kaunda to reflect that the number of soldiers now in jail makes it seem doubtful whether the army would support him in any real showdown.[14]

It is a cruel irony that the political independence, economic potential and diplomatic visibility of Zimbabwe only compound Zambia's difficulties in coming to grips with the interrelated problems of its own political economy. ■

[12]On this factional debate see Timothy M. Shaw, "Dilemmas of Dependence and (Under) Development: Conflicts and Choices in Zambia's Present and Prospective Foreign Policy," *Africa Today*, vol. 26, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter, 1979), pp. 43–65.

[13]*World Development Report, 1981*, p. 79.

[14]"Zambia: A Coup in Every Plot," *The Economist*, August 1, 1981, p. 38.


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Dar es Salaam
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ANGOLA
Lake Nyasa
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COMORO IS.
ZAMBIA
Lusaka
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MADAGASCAR
Antananarivo
Salisbury
ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
Pretoria
Maputo
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